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Tempered Power, Variegated Capitalism,
Law and Society
JOHN BRAITHWAITE†
I. TEMPERING POWER AT BALDY
The Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy has a richly
variegated intellectual history to celebrate for its fortieth
anniversary. Indeed, the law school that houses Baldy was a
mother-ship of the law and society movement. In his history
of the Baldy Center, Luke Hammill notes that Lynn Mather,
soon to be a Baldy Director, spoke of the germinal 1975 Law
and Society Association conference in the following terms:
According to that conference program, there were exactly 100
participants. . . . There were also well-known names such as Lon
Fuller, E. Adamson Hoebel and Alan Dershowitz. The group was
small enough that Red Schwartz, then dean of the law school, was
able to invite them all to his Buffalo home for the concluding
reception.1

This Article focuses more specifically on the Baldy role,
from its inception, as a founder of the socio-legal tradition of
regulatory studies; that is, the study of steering
concentrations of power. The diversity of Baldy
† Australian National University. My thanks to Philip Pettit for comments on
aspects of the paper and to the participants at Buffalo and to Jacinta Mulders for
research assistance.
1. LUKE HAMMILL, 40 YEARS AT THE BALDY CENTER: A LAW AND SOCIETY HUB
(2018).
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interdisciplinary scholarship offers a galaxy of gems of
variegated insight for my project as set out here. This
includes knowledge from critical legal studies, private
enforcement of environmental laws, relational rights
enforcement, Buddhist law and compassion, and on
regulatory communities and regulatory cultures. Then there
is the more encompassing Baldy contribution of
strengthening our capacity to focus both the “regulatory
lens” and the “law and society lens.” Valuable lenses they
have proved to be in the hands of so many Baldy scholars
across these past forty years.
In this Article, I use the insights from the fields of
knowledge collected at Baldy to consider how to temper
power, and how to transform bad power in a society through
good power. This is a non-linear art, which is partly a sort of
ju-jitsu of using power against itself. In contemporary
conditions, where power has shifted so greatly from states to
capital, it is necessarily an art of responsiveness to
variegations of capitalism, and major societal crises can be
transformational tipping points. I will illustrate these ideas
through the specific challenges of tempering the power of
finance and accomplishing conditions of fair work. It is
argued that unless these challenges of tempering power are
met, globally liberal capitalism will continue to lose influence
not to the communism it long feared, but to authoritarian
capitalism engendered by a tempering of communism with
capitalism. This Article argues that inadequate regulation of
finance, unfair labor practices, and crumbling environmental
governance pose existential threats to liberal capitalism.
A. Baldy Insights
As a starting point, Baldy’s work on Law, Buddhism,
and Social Change led by former Director Rebecca French
may seem esoteric, though not for those who hail from
Buddhist societies, and not for the subject of this essay.
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When the Dalai Lama spoke at Baldy in 2006,2 his theme
was compassion in the implementation of law, and
responsive attention to context in law’s implementation. I
read that contribution as one about compassion and context
in the tempering of power, a craft the Dalai Lama lovingly
masters. The Dalai Lama pursues relational justice and
relational social justice in his advocacy of nonviolent
resistance to tyranny. He lives this as he works for freedom
for his beloved Tibet. His insights have applications beyond
the field of his immediate influence, and will be used later in
this essay to show how relational justice and compassionate
tempering of power can be used in struggles to regulate
variegated capitalism.
From the work of the Baldy Center we also learn that
while commerce and law are often brutal, law can be
compassionate when it embraces gifts of compassion through
pro bono values.3 American divorce law evinces both vicious
excess as well as the compassion, beauty, and relational
justice of the collaborative family law movement—so
admired and indeed emulated by two law firms in my little
Australian city.4 In Australia, we are grateful for the
collaborative quality of the socio-legal research community
on divorce that has enjoyed so much fellowship and
leadership from Buffalo. My personal favorite from Baldy on
how relational law can temper power is David Engel and
Frank Munger on disability rights,5 showing that in
America, reputationally the homeland of adversarial legal
2. See generally Rebecca R. French, Law, Buddhism, and Social Change: A
Conversation with the 14th Dalai Lama, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (2007).
3. See PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds.,
2009).
4. See LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001); JULIE TAYLOR & JUNE THOBURN,
COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE WITH VULNERABLE CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
(2017).
5. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003).
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formalism, disability rights law has transformed the lives of
disabled people for the better. Yet in Engel and Munger’s
empirical sample, no disabled person ever resorted to
litigation to enforce their new rights. Rather, what happened
was that the college student in a wheelchair would pitch an
appeal for relational justice to her Dean. She would appeal
to the Dean’s compassion as she invoked informally her new
legal right to a ramp to access a building. America’s ramp
arrived; new rights were vindicated across your country
through relational power and compassionate strength. Social
justice was transformed through many such decisive
moments of assertion.
This Article argues a counterintuitive case for
compassionate and relational justice in regulating the
excesses of Wall Street. Yet my argument is premised on the
belief that this can only succeed if two conditions are met:
first, if such justice is responsive to new variegations of
capitalism; and second, if a “Sword of Damocles” stands
behind relational and compassionate justice to take decisive
action in the courts at the moment of exception.6 In this
context, the state of exception stands in exactly the opposite
place to where it is put by Carl Schmitt7 and Giorgio
Agamben:8 for them, the state of exception is where tyranny
takes over from rule of law. The Dalai Lama’s state of
exception arises instead where pursuit of compassionate
justice is overtaken by formal law enforcement (for example,
in the case of responsibility to protect being activated in
international law when compassionate appeals are
bludgeoned by untempered power). In a similar way,
6. This Sword of Damocles part of the argument is thinly theorized in this
Article. I acknowledge the influence of the work of Lawrence Sherman and many
others in another essay on when and how relational justice should be supplanted
by deterrent or incapacitative justice as a last resort in John Braithwaite,
Minimally Sufficient Deterrence, 47 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 69 (2018).
7. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2005) (1922).
8. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of
Chi. Press ed. 2005).
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unbridled corporate power can be bound through a relational
justice of internationally networked justice, and without
bringing in the troops. By putting Wall Street in harness
with the “99 percent,” by binding business back together with
the people through justice, capitalism can be more
sustainable and make more money more sustainably in the
long run. We can appeal to Wall Street in strategic
regulatory
conversations9
by
appealing
to
their
compassionate interest in leaving the society better for their
grandchildren.10 The alternative we can put to them is that
more, or even worse events than those that occurred in 2008,
will one day leave their society and their banks in ruins.
II. TEMPERED POWER11
Martin Krygier has elaborated some persuasive
arguments about abuse of power that render ideals such as
limiting, curbing, or controlling power less appealing than
“tempering” power.12 Power is a good thing; it is needed to
enforce legal judgements, to keep the peace, to raise funds to
build schools and hospitals. It is untempered power that is
bad because it is arbitrary power. Arbitrary power in turn is
conceived as unchecked power. Power can be checked in
many ways—by balances of power, such as two houses in a
legislature, or federalism—but accountability is the most

9. See Julia Black, Regulatory Conversations, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 163 (2002).
10. Braithwaite and Drahos have argued that webs of dialogue can do most
of the work of global business regulation, but that webs of controls that include
formal enforcement of state and international law are also important at many
moments of exception at the peaks of private, public, and civil society
enforcement pyramids. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY
CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER (2008).
11. In this analysis I not only draw heavily on Martin Krygier and Baldy
Center thinking. I have also drawn on previous publications, particularly some I
have co-authored with Hilary Charlesworth, Adérito Soares, and Philip Pettit.
These previous works are cited in the sections of text where they are discussed.
12. Martin Krygier, Tempering Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE
34, 35 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017).
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important way of checking power. Accountability to the rule
of law is the most important form of accountability. But there
are many other forms of accountability beyond the rule of
law.13 The classic conception of accountability involves being
required to give an account to which people can listen and
respond, as in producing minutes of a meeting after all
opinions are heard at the meeting, financial “accounts” are
tabled, and hard questions are asked of officeholders.14
Accountability in family life for children who hit their
siblings involves requiring them to reflect on how their
sibling would have felt, on whether what they did was right,
and some kind of rectification such as an apology.
Power that is tempered by the rule of law’s discipline is
more resilient in important ways. It grows authority in the
art of regulation and governance; authority can be
distinguished from domination (which is untempered,
arbitrary power). Freedom as non-domination is the
conception of freedom valorized in Philip Pettit’s republican
theory of freedom, which will be discussed further in the next
section.15 The republican regulatory theory interpretation of
the tempering of power is that power should be regulated to
maximize freedom. The essence of being unfree according to
this republican conception is the condition of being a slave.
To be a slave is to be subject to the arbitrary power of
another. The slave-owner is not required to listen to the slave
nor to give any account to the slave, or anyone much else.
The slave is the property of a slave-owner, who can do
whatever he wishes with his private property without being
constrained by laws that apply to persons. The capricious
13. I am grateful to the conversation at the 2018 “Tempering Power”
symposium and for discussions afterwards with Martin Krygier and Philip Pettit,
which went to the rejection of lists of attributes for what is involved in tempering
power in favor of an accountability emphasis combined with recognition that
accountability takes many forms beyond classic lists of rule of law virtues.
14. See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITIES IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (2003).
15. See Philip Pettit on freedom as non-domination as a republican virtue.
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM (1997).
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power of domination struggles to build long-run legitimacy
and the trust so vital to contemporary economies, which
cannot flourish as slave societies. What worked well enough
for the economics of machine bureaucracies that built
pyramids or operated plantations cannot work for an
innovative information economy.
For Krygier, and for ancient Greek philosophers who
advanced temperance as a virtue, temperance means a
“moderating balance of elements” (for example, justice
balanced with compassion).16 Tempered steel is made
tougher, less hard, and less brittle as an alloy (a balance of
more resilient metals) in a test of extreme heat. For Krygier,
this tempering metaphor in governance means tempered
power is less brutal and less brittle, and “infrastructural”
rather than “despotic,”17 because arbitrary power in pursuit
of its whims is constrained by rule of law and other
accountability institutions in a way that untempered power
is not, and so power is less available for the arbitrary pursuit
of power-holders’ whims. Accountability institutions that
temper power grow deeper roots of authority for the
enactment of power. This is what enables power to become
more infrastructural in a way that penetrates a society. The
institutional infrastructure of tempered power makes it more
enduring as a rule of law virtue compared to an arbitrary
“rule of men.”18 In his essay in this volume, Krygier asks why
16. Krygier, supra note 12, at 47.
17. Michael Mann, Infrastuctural Power Revisited, 43 STUD. INT’L COMP. DEV.
355, 355 (2008).
18. Likewise, when in common usage we temper justice with mercy, we
strengthen justice. Soldiers that are tempered by combat are hardened, but also
moderated through the wisdom and prudence of experience. When music is
tempered it becomes more powerful in the sense of more beautiful because it can
be modulated into other keys. Tempering a sauce in cooking means gently
heating egg yolk or a dairy ingredient before adding it to improve a hot sauce
while avoiding curdling. Linda Larsen, Temper in Baking and Cooking, SPRUCE
EATS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.thespruceeats.com/learn-the-definition-oftemper-4050806. Usage of the concept of tempering has been in continuous
decline since the late 1700s, Definition of ‘Temper’, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/temper (last visited May 8,
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we should want law to rule; for what purpose is rule of law a
good thing? The answer he elaborates in a more developed
way than in my essay is tempering power so that arbitrary
abuse of power is checked.19
Using the example of constitutions, Krygier quotes
Stephen Holmes on the error of seeing constitutions only as
a restraint on power. Constitutions are also empowering in
that they enable infrastructural concentration of power for
good purposes:
Limited government is, or can be, more powerful than unlimited
government. . . . [T]hat constraints can be enabling, which is far
from being a contradiction, lies at the heart of liberal
constitutionalism . . . By restricting the arbitrary powers of
government officials, a liberal constitution can, under the right
conditions, increase the state’s capacity to focus on specific problems
and mobilize collective resources for common purposes.20

Transformative Constitutionalism (in South Africa)21 is
just one example of the rich variety of tempering traversed
in this issue. It ranges from immigration activism tempering
arbitrary power over border crossings,22 to challengers to
physician domination in health care,23 to state domination in
China.24 These are just selective examples of the diversity of
2019), though it experienced renewal at the hands of massive NGOs like the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union in the late nineteenth century. Krygier
and I have always been yesterday’s men.
19. Martin Krygier, What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
[page #] (2019).
20. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, at xi (1995).
21. Heinz Klug, Transformative Constitutions and the Role of Integrity
Institutions in Tempering Power: The Case of Resistance to State Capture in PostApartheid South Africa, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page #] (2019).
22. Susan Bibler Coutin, “Otro Mundo Es Posible”: Tempering the Power of
Immigration Law Through Activism, Advocacy, and Action, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
[page #] (2019).
23. Mary Anne Bobinski, Law and Power in Health Care: Challenges to
Physician Control, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page #] (2019).
24. Kwai Hang Ng, Is China a “Rule-by-Law” Regime?, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page
#] (2019).
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checks on arbitrary power diagnosed across the contributions
to this volume. Part of the ambition arising from the
scattered themes of my contribution is the conclusion that
diverse, plural checks are the heartland of meaningfully
tempered power. One reason advanced for this is that
concentrations of power are so variegated in the conditions
of contemporary capitalism.
III. MAKING THE THEORY PRACTICAL: TEMPERING
TYRANNY IN TIMOR
A. Tempered Power in Timor-Leste
First, I illustrate what it means to temper power through
my Timor-Leste work with Hilary Charlesworth and Adérito
Soares in the book Networked Governance of Freedom and
Tyranny.25 This research is also used to introduce the
arguments about tempering financial power later in this
Article.
In Indonesia, East Timorese student leadership was
critical to the people power movement on the streets of
Jakarta that helped democratize the country and overthrow
the crony capitalist regime of President Suharto in 1998. In
the process, East Timorese people power won democracy for
an independent Timor-Leste. Our book is about how that was
accomplished by networked governance, after the fulcrum of
struggle shifted from armed struggle (rather as in South
Africa’s transition from Apartheid). In Baldy Center terms,
this was a regulatory community26 led from civil society that
regulated regime change at the commanding heights of the
state. But the transition was rocky, punctuated by moments
of extreme authoritarianism and violence, especially in 2006
when a UN peacekeeping mission had to return to Timor.
25. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, HILARY CHARLESWORTH & ADÉRITO SOARES,
NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF FREEDOM AND TYRANNY: PEACE IN TIMOR-LESTE
(2012).
26. See Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 L. &
POL’Y 355 (1987).

536

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

The problem was that once the new leadership group
consolidated sovereignty over independent Timor-Leste after
the 1999 UN referendum, leaders willfully cut themselves off
from the networks of marginalized people in civil society that
had helped them humble power in Jakarta in the first place.
This was rather like what happened with the consolidation
of sovereignty into the hands of post-Mandela African
National Congress leaders. Our book displays how weapons
of the weak in civil society were mobilized a second time to
temper the power of their President and Prime Minister and
rebuild a very distinctive and variegated hybrid of separated
powers in a genuinely democratic Timor-Leste today. The
mechanisms whereby networked governance by the weak
can overwhelm great powers, rendering realist international
relations theory predictively false, has long been a focus of
Martin Krygier, our research group at the Australian
National University,27 and yours at the Baldy Center.28 Like
Krygier in his work on contemporary Eastern Europe, 29 we
focus on the concern that the forces organized against
domination become sources of domination from the moment
they assume sovereignty over a state.
We interpreted the problem with the Timor transition as
being that it was not republican enough in terms of Philip
Pettit’s republican political theory.30 Up until 2006,
transitional governance failed to keep working at
27. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 10, at 3.
28. I interpret Errol Meidinger’s work on the networked power of regulatory
communities and regulatory cultures in these terms here, and likewise his work
on civil society environmental institutions like the Forest Stewardship Council.
See Meidinger, supra note 26; Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global
Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006).
29. See Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota, After Postcommunism: The Next
Phase, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 299 (2006); Martin Krygier, Virtuous Circles:
Antipodean Reflections on Power, Institutions, and Civil Society, 11 E. EUR. POL.
& SOCIETIES 36 (1996); Martin Krygier, Is there Constitutionalism after
Communism? Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism, and the Rule of Law,
in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 77 (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota
eds., 2016).
30. See PETTIT, supra note 15.
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institutionalizing tempered power. Yet when their leaders
directed arbitrary power back at civil society, especially at
the Catholic Church, civil society re-mobilized and reestablished a richer democracy with tempered power after
2006. The book’s title, Networked Governance of Freedom
and Tyranny, signifies networks restraining excesses of
realist international diplomacy and checking excesses of
executive domination within a state to deliver republican
freedom. We define networked governance as the action of
plural actors linked by coordinating dialogue. Relational
dialogue encompasses both interdependence and sufficient
autonomy for different nodes of the network to check and
balance other nodes of (tempered) power. Networks can only
govern themselves nodally.31 Inherent in that proposition is
the fact that even sincere democrats who seize nodal control
are at risk of corrupting the separation of powers to preserve
their hard-won power. While networked governance has a
more variegated horizontal architecture than state
governance,32 networks of capacity and accountability can be
linked to every level of multi-level governance. This includes
every layer of sub-national, national, and international
hierarchies. Sometimes they are coordinated by state
regulation, sometimes not.
We distinguish republican freedom from other
conceptions by characterizing it as freedom as nondomination.33 This is the type of freedom delivered by
31. See Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 30
(2005); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer
Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y
400 (2003).
32. See 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY, in THE
INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (1996); THEORIES OF
DEMOCRATIC NETWORK GOVERNANCE (Eva Sørensen & Jacob Torfing eds., 2008);
Eva Sørensen & Jacob Torfing, Making Governance Networks Effective and
Democratic Through Metagovernance, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 234 (2009).
33. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1990); BRAITHWAITE, CHARLESWORTH & SOARES,
supra note 25, at 7; PETTIT, supra note 15.
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tempered power. Networked accountabilities that temper
power enable regimes to change in ways that prevent one
form of enslavement from replacing another. Domination can
be continuously challenged by networks that renew
themselves with novel ways of checking power that are not
confined to enduring constitutional balances. Variegation in
checks and balances is our theme here.34 I join others like
Jamie Peck35 in this focus on understanding variegated
capitalism.

34. With finance, critiques that rely on the neoliberalism trope are rarely
specific enough to describe what is happening in contemporary capitalism. See
Andrew Kipnis, Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of
Neoliberalism in the People’s Republic of China, 13 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL
INST. 383 (2007).
35. See Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Variegated Capitalism, 31 PROGRESS
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 731 (2007); Jamie Peck, Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring
Polanyian Economic Geographies, 45 ENV’T & PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 1536
(2013); Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Variegated Neoliberalization:
Geographies, Modalities, Pathways, 10 GLOBAL NETWORKS 182 (2010); Jamie
Peck & Jun Zhang, A Variety of Capitalism . . . with Chinese Characteristics?, 13
J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 357 (2013); Jun Zhang & Jamie Peck, Variegated
Capitalism, Chinese Style: Regional Models, Multi-Scalar Constructions, 50
REGIONAL STUD. 52 (2016); see also MARTIN HESS, GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS
AND VARIEGATED CAPITALISM: (SELF-)REGULATING LABOUR IN CAMBODIAN
GARMENT FACTORIES (2013); Adam D. Dixon, Variegated Capitalism and the
Geography of Finance: Towards a Common Agenda, 35 PROGRESS HUM.
GEOGRAPHY 193 (2011); Bob Jessop, Capitalist Diversity and Variety: Variegation,
the World Market, Compossibility and Ecological Dominance, 38 CAPITAL & CLASS
45 (2014) [hereinafter Jessop, Capitalist Diversity and Variety]; Bob Jessop,
Comparative Capitalisms and/or Variegated Capitalism, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
COMPARATIVE CAPITALISMS RESEARCH 65 (Matthias Ebenau et al., eds., 2015);
Kean Fan Lim, On China’s Growing Geo-Economic Influence and the Evolution
of Variegated Capitalism, 41 GEOFORUM 677 (2010) [hereinafter Lim, On China’s
Growing Geo-Economic Influence]; Kean Fan Lim, ‘Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics’: Uneven Development, Variegated Neoliberalization and the
Dialectical Differentiation of State Spatiality, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 221
(2014) [hereinafter Lim, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics]; Andreas
Mulvad, Competing Hegemonic Projects within China’s Variegated Capitalism:
‘Liberal’ Guangdong vs. ‘Statist’ Chongqing, 20 NEW POL. ECON. 199 (2015); IChun Catherine Chang & Eric Sheppard, China’s Eco-Cities as Variegated Urban
Sustainability: Dongtan Eco-City and Chongming Eco-Island, 20 J. URB. TECH.
57 (2013); Ugo Rossi, The Variegated Economics and the Potential Politics of the
Smart City, 4 TERRITORY POL. GOVERNANCE 337 (2016); Luis Felipe Alvarez León,
The Digital Economy and Variegated Capitalism, 40 CAN. J. COMM. 637 (2015).
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The politics of how to temper power in such a world must
involve variegated separations of powers. One of the more
exotic variegations we directly witnessed in the
traditionalist, predominantly rural village society of TimorLeste in 2006 was the ritual ripping out of the heart of an
unfortunate pig in the presence of dead ancestors angered by
the capricious exercise of power by the country’s cabal of
leaders. I had a ring-side seat, unfortunately next to the pig.
There were genuine tears from these party hard-men that
their people had found it necessary to humble their power
under the wiser eyes of the ancestors in this way. As a result,
these leaders genuinely did re-empower the institutions of
traditional civil society presided over by the ancestors, as
well as the church, opposition political parties, and to some
degree the courts and the Constitution after 2006. Somehow
I fear that invocation of appalled ancestors might not work
with Donald Trump’s America. For variegation to work it
must be responsively attuned to local meaning-making.
Here there is common ground with other theoretical
traditions that have flourished at the Baldy Center, such as
critical legal studies,36 in particular the notion of
“destabilization rights” that Roberto Unger37 introduced.
Charles Sabel and William Simon38 further developed the
concept of destabilization rights within the somewhat
different American pragmatist tradition of “democratic
experimentalism.” These are rights to unsettle and open up
state institutions that persistently fail to fulfil their
functions. Destabilization rights are dynamic checks on
failures of institutionalized accountabilities to do their job.
For example, the right to private litigation can destabilize

36. See generally HAMMILL, supra note 1.
37. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTINECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
38. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1098–99 (2004).
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defunct structures of environmental regulation.39 Similarly,
rights of oppressed minorities can appeal for redress to UN
institutions. Destabilization rights enable a politics of disentrenchment. Networks can deliver experimental
innovation by invigorating the separation of powers. The
state is often too dug in to ancient entrenchments for
innovation and democratic experimentalism. Western
doctrine on the separation of powers has stultified because it
has not been open to learning from the democratic
experimentalism in civil separations of powers revealed in
non-Western histories such as that of Timor-Leste, Thailand,
and China.
Republics must radically pluralize their vision of how to
separate and temper powers within the state so the state has
many branches of separated powers rather than just the
traditional three (legislature, judiciary, and executive). Can
we enliven a political imperative for separations of powers
that progressively become more separated? The history of
Timor-Leste can be read as one of progressive struggle for
continuous improvement in securing ever more separated
powers: not just for Montesquieu’s40 tripartite separation of
powers among an executive, legislature and judiciary, but for
much more variegated and indigenously attuned separations
of ever more powers; not just separations of government
powers, but division of both private and public powers. We
documented dozens of separated powers in response to
Timor-Leste’s post-conflict dominations. In a similar way,
President Eisenhower’s concept of breaking up the militaryindustrial complex in the United States captures this idea of
a newly identified variegation of power that had to be
tempered in the 1950s.41 Capitalism is a continuous process
39. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws,
34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 940 (1985).
40. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed.,
Thomas Nugent trans., 1977) (1748).
41. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961).
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of creatively destroying old concentrations of power and
constituting even more worrying ones. Hence the struggle for
freedom must be more than struggle for a new democratic
constitution that guarantees a conclusive separation of
powers. It must be contestation of an ever-evanescent
constitutionalism that struggles to continuously deepen
separations of powers at every stage of a nation’s history.
B. The Promise of Republicanism
Republicanism is conceived as a political philosophy of
continuous struggle for more effective complexes of
separated powers.42 A republic is an unfinished struggle
towards a polity where each separated power has sufficient
clout to exercise its own functions with support from other
separated powers. This is not a new perspective. Hannah
Arendt quoted Benjamin Rush who in 1787 complained of
those who confuse the struggles of the “American revolution
with those of the late American war. The American war is
over: but this is far from being the case with the American
revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the
great drama is closed.”43
A republic is a polity where no one center of power is so
dominant that it can crush any other separated power
without the other separated powers mobilizing to push back
that domination. In our book on Timor-Leste, we are at one
with Holmes and Krygier on the imperative to have a
positively empowering vision of the constitution:
Republicanism does not require powers that are so diffused that
separated powers cannot act decisively. The executive is empowered
to declare war, the judge to declare guilt, the legislature to declare

42. See Michael Barnett, Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States
after War, 30 INT’L SECURITY 87 (2006); Michael Barnett & Christoph Zürcher,
The Peacebuilder’s Compact: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak
Statehood, in THE DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE OPERATIONS 23 (Roland Paris & Timothy D.
Sisk eds., 2009).
43. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 301 (Compass Books 1965).
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laws. Decisiveness for the judge is actually enhanced by the
knowledge that only an appellate court can overturn her decision on
an error of law; she cannot be dominated by a prime minister who
demands the acquittal of a political crony. Decisiveness for a
constable on the street is knowing that she is the one with the power
to decide whether to arrest a judge who appears to assault his wife;
then it is no longer in her hands but in the hands of the separated
powers of a prosecutor. Decisiveness for a general is knowing that
once the executive declares war, she can conduct it in accordance
with laws of war approved by the legislature, without interference
from politicians who think of themselves as armchair generals.
Of course, a mature constitutional debate is needed to finetune
separated powers to ensure that each can decisively perform its
function without domination from any centralising power and
without confusion as to who exercises each separated power, and
under what norms. None of this is to deny that democracies must at
times debate trade-offs between greater accountability and greater
efficiency. Separated powers of civil society and the media to speak
assertively during those constitutional debates are critical elements
of separated powers that get the separation clear and effective.44

We argue that dynamism is a neglected topic in
discussion of the separation of powers. One of the things
republican revolutions have done throughout history is disentrench powers, such as the powers of kings and dictators.
Destabilization rights and “democratic experimentalism,”45
as mentioned above, unsettle and open up state institutions
that persistently fail to fulfil their functions. Networks are
needed to deliver experimental innovation in the
invigoration of separations of powers because of state
propensities to rigidify.
One risk of richly separated powers is that they will
result in gridlock. We argue that networked separations of
powers are themselves the best ways of tempering the
inefficiency of gridlock:
Our argument has been that, for most tasks of modern
governance, networks get things done better than hierarchies. Welldesigned networks of power are not only mutually checking upon
bad uses of power; they are also mutually enabling of good
capacities for power. Networks must be coordinated and

44. BRAITHWAITE, CHARLESWORTH & SOARES, supra note 25, at 128–29.
45. See supra sources cited in notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
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sometimes—not always—the state is the best candidate to supply a
key node of coordination. For most problems, strengthening state
hierarchy to solve problems is not as effective as strengthening
checks and balances on hierarchy as we also strengthen private–
public partnerships, professions with technocratic expertise on that
problem, civil society engagement and vigilance, and other
networks of governance, while at the same time strengthening
coordination of networked governance. The most effective
governance is rarely centrally monopolised; it is usually messily
attentive to multiple accountabilities.
This is not to deny that there must be agreement on who will
make the final call on matters that have not reached resolution after
deep contestation under a separation of powers. Elections are one
such state institution with this usefully ultimate capacity to break
a logjam (without violence). So are state courts. On legal matters,
as valuable as it is to have a rich tapestry of legal pluralism where
the national rugby judiciary regulates most violence on rugby fields,
it is also valuable to have state appellate courts that have the
legitimacy to make ultimate decisions on the basis of a synoptic view
of all the adjudication that has occurred across that tapestry.
····
Gridlock is a risk of separated powers. Often it is more important
that things are settled than settled right. Paralysis and
disengagement in the face of great problems are profound risks, not
only in times of war. Executive government has an oversight
responsibility for ensuring that really big problems do not fall
between the cracks. This is not the same as saying the government
should fix them. It is to say that the state has a responsibility to
take a synoptic view of a society, and to catalyse action when lesser
actors are paralysed by the enormity of the challenge. We see this
need most acutely at times of great natural disasters when so many
leaders of civil society are busy bailing out their house or looking for
lost families. One of the great examples of a chief executive with
synoptic vision in the twentieth century was China’s Deng Xiaoping
when he saw in 1978 that the institutions of state production were
bogged down. He opened up the Chinese economy to private
institutions that broke through many of the production bottlenecks
and bureaucratic gridlocks that were grinding the economy to a
halt.
We might even say that the most important role of state political
leaders is to be gridlock breakers: to get that budget through the
legislative contestation process, to issue an ultimatum to an enemy
state of a kind that has less meaning when only a general issues it.
Yet the ultimate power to break gridlock resides with the people
when they take to the streets in a revolutionary moment in which
they persuade the media or the military to side with the revolution.
Republicans hope these will be revolutionary moments that disentrench bad power and entrench new separations of powers that
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secure freedom from domination. 46

IV. TEMPERING WALL STREET
This theoretical architecture on networked regulation to
temper power will now be applied to the regulation of the
commanding heights of corporate power. It will then inform
a more multi-level account of tempering contemporary
capitalism.
The 2008 financial crisis in the United States did not
occur because of a failure to temper power in any classic
Montesquieu sense:47 the U.S. executive government did not
crush a legislature that was trying to implement the
regulatory reforms needed to prevent the crisis. Likewise,
the crash did not occur because the courts were insufficiently
independent of the President and the legislature. One reason
it did occur was that ratings agencies, which are paid to hold
the solvency of banks and hedge funds to account, were
insufficiently independent of the private interests they were
rating. Boards of directors of great banks exercised
insufficient independence of judgment over leveraging, over
the hedge fund traders and the housing loan brokers who
made them rich. Board audit committees failed. Major
accounting firms failed to blow the whistle in countless
cases—a lesson that should have been learned from the
previous 2001 downturn when Arthur Andersen failed to do
its job of auditing with independence Enron, WorldCom, and
other companies that collapsed.48
The Global Financial Crisis was not caused by a failure
of the tripartite separation of powers in the public sector, but
by a failure of powers to be sufficiently separated within the
private sector. More profoundly, there were failures of public
branches of power to be sufficiently separated from Wall
46. BRAITHWAITE, CHARLESWORTH & SOARES, supra note 25, at 302–04
47. See generally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 40.
48. See John Braithwaite, Flipping Markets to Virtue with Qui Tam and
Restorative Justice, 38 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 458, 463 (2013).
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Street power. The legislature and executive failed to enact
and enforce regulations requiring these culpable private
powers to be separated and tempered. Financial regulators
were insufficiently independent of the president, and of a
legislature captured by a Wall Street that had funded their
election. And there was a failure of the IMF to call U.S.
monetary imbalance to account in the way it is so willing to
do with powerless states. It was a failure of the ratings
agencies to call the big institutions of American capitalism to
account in a way they might have had the culpable banks
been banks in more marginal economies. What then followed
was the failure of the New York Stock Exchange to deliver
financial transparency, and failure of the global banking
regulators at Basel to call U.S. bank regulators to account in
a way they might have had the banking regulators and
monetary institutions been in weaker states.
In the separation of economic powers in multi-level
governance, as in the separation of state powers, it is
important that an independent sphere of action for each
power is guaranteed. Each separated power of business
regulation must not be dominated by any one power calling
the shots above all others. Of course, there may be situations
where a dictator who calls the shots can increase economic
efficiency by overruling a court or a regulator that is
needlessly slowing investment that would benefit the people.
The experience of history, however, is that autocrats more often
exercise their domination for corrupt and patrimonial purposes that
reduce the efficiency of national resource allocation. So in the long
run many separations of powers that seem inefficient to the
politically naive are in practice economically efficient.
Part of the efficiency dividend from separations of powers that are
attuned to local realities is from a more efficient division of labour.
Because central bank board members focus their intelligence and
training on the large and intricate challenge of securing monetary
balance for an economy, they are likely to make better decisions of
this specialist kind than are the generalist politicians of the cabinet.
Because police training is in community policing that enrols the
community to do most of the serious business of crime control, they
become better at it than the military with their training and
experience in the use of maximum force. Our Timor-Leste narrative
has well illustrated the provocation and inefficiency that can arise
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when the military takes over public order policing.49

With these historical lessons in hand of hedged virtues
of variegated separations that temper financial power, let us
now consider more deeply the contemporary challenges of
variegated capitalism to which separated powers must
respond.
V. TEMPERING VARIEGATED CAPITALISM
A. Variegating Capitalism to Architectural Regulation
Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning wrote in 2003
about how Disney World regulates its little customers to
keep them safe.50 Basically it channels them into queues of
children tall enough for particular rides and into machines
with an architecture of bars. It does not regulate them by
punishing them for behaving in an unsafe or disorderly way.
It makes it impossible for them to stand up dangerously or
to wave. This is accomplished by bars that encase them.
Their arms are prevented from being ripped off not by a
normative order, not by a punitive order, but by architectural
regulation.
At the time, this seemed a quaint, exotic work. But after
the rise of Silicon Valley capitalism, what Lawrence Lessig
called “architectural regulation” became quite dominant.51
Microsoft, then Google and Facebook came to architecturally
regulate us through the internet. They steer how events flow
through our lives.52 Tech giants steer us to their favored
software products; they steer us to their customized news
49. BRAITHWAITE, CHARLESWORTH & SOARES, supra note 25, at 300.
50. Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, From the Panopticon to Disney
World: The Development of Discipline, in CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES:
ESSENTIAL READINGS 499 (Eugene McLaughlin & John Muncie eds., 3d ed. 2013).
51. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
52. Parker and Braithwaite define regulation as action with the intent of
steering the flow of events. See Christine Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 119 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet
eds., 2003).
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services (now purged of fake news of course); to products that
pay a premium to jump to the head of the queue in search
engines; they are harnessed by clever Russian intelligence
operatives to steer votes; harnessed by National Security
Agency programs with vivid code names like Muscular and
Prism that monitor our movements.53 In free societies
Facebook and Google allow us to see WikiLeaks revelations
about how the national security state works. Authoritarian
societies steer us away from seeing secrets of the deep state.
If we live in Myanmar, the sixty Burmese language Facebook
censors Mark Zuckerberg employed in June 2018 deploy the
architectural regulation of cyberspace to interrupt genocidal
hate speech for the cleansing of Rohingya.54 Spookiness is the
business model of this stalker economy in cyberspace. It is a
variegation of capitalism that gives us a lot of free stuff if we
agree to be tracked. When the product is free, people
increasingly realize that they are the product. Twitter,
LinkedIn, Snapchat, Facebook, and others commodify the
very networking that we argued in the Timor case study to
be citizens’ crucial bulwark against tyranny.
Former Baldy Student Fellow, Natasha Tusikov, has
brilliantly dissected this new regulatory challenge.55 She
shows how networking generates troves of data that can be
exploited by advertisers, pornographers, and the deep state
alike. The data comes from all the companies mentioned, as
well as others like eBay, PayPal, and Yahoo. So enmeshed
are the connections between the national security state and
internet capital that Eisenhower’s threat of the militaryindustrial complex is now surpassed by a deep-state-Silicon-

53. NATASHA TUSIKOV, CHOKEPOINTS: GLOBAL PRIVATE REGULATION
INTERNET passim (2016).

ON THE

54. Press Release, Facebook, Update on Myanmar (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar/.
55. See TUSIKOV, supra note 53. Tusikov now teaches at York University and
acknowledges Baldy and its Director Errol Meidinger in the Acknowledgements
to Chokepoints. Id. at xiv.
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Valley complex.56 It is an information-syphoning intelligence
complex. Tusikov illustrates the potential for architectural
self-regulation of cyberspace at “chokepoints.”57 Global
internet firms exert control at these chokepoints for the
commercial purpose of catching people who purloin
intellectual property. How does the largely U.S. and U.K.
state regulation to accomplish this chokepoint selfregulation work? It is, Tusikov finds, mostly through
conversation with the internet giants rather than punitive or
litigious. It works by an architecture of the internet giants
controlling flows of information at chokepoints, tracking
down counterfeiters, blocking their access to vital
commercial and technical services, and disabling websites
used by counterfeiters.
Political leaders, captured by intellectual property
interests and by the deep state, grant considerably
untempered powers to these gatekeepers of cyberspace. Even
when Facebook does good, it does bad because of the
untempered quality of its hegemony. While it may be good
that Facebook seeks to stop advocacy of Islamic terrorism on
the internet, it threatens freedom when that script allows it
to be co-opted by the government of India to crush free speech
among Muslims in Kashmir protesting the very real tyranny
and denial of human rights they suffer at the hands of a
Hindu regime.58 Who guards these guardians? Only invisible
deep states. Do citizens have a say in gatekeeping decisions
about what does and does not cross the line into child
pornography, who is a terrorist and who is a freedom-fighter,
what is obscenity and what is art, what is counterfeiting and
what is life-saving production of legal generic drugs? No.
Tusikov shows that chokepoint regulation is powerful
56. See id. passim.
57. Id. at 29–31.
58. Facebook issued a statement explaining its actions in these terms: “There
is no place on Facebook for content that praises or supports terrorists, terrorist
organisations or terrorism.” Gowhar Geelani, Facebook Under Fire over Kashmir
Killings Gag, DAWN (July 21, 2016), https://www.dawn.com/news/1272206/.
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architectural regulation without law and without democratic
accountability of any meaningful kind. Not only that, the
“rule of men” can mean men in trench coats from just two
states, the United States and United Kingdom (which count
among only a handful of net intellectual property-exporting
states). They rule over the citizens of almost two hundred
other states (which are net intellectual property importers),
from Australia to Argentina to Africa. In other words, states
that benefit from the highest levels of expansive intellectual
property monopoly rights are the informal rulemakers;
citizens of states with an interest in tempered monopoly are
ruletakers. Rule by “secret handshake deals” between
executives of the U.S. state and its internet giants happened
precisely because laws in the Congress to achieve the same
result ran up against massive citizen protests inside the
United States, and globally. An “Internet Blackout” on
January 18, 2012 was the most effective and widely
democratic online protest the world had ever seen, shutting
down many major websites, including Wikipedia and
Google.59
What is mostly gagged in Tusikov’s chokepoint
regulation is access to income through cutting off payment
services, access to advertising, search, marketplaces, and
domain name services. Details of the regulatory technology
are not important here, nor of how Tusikov accessed secret
non-legal relational regulation by interrogating Edward
Snowden’s disclosures. What matters is Tusikov’s insight
that a major new variegation of capitalism can grow quickly
to include the wealthiest corporations on the planet.
Completely new modalities of regulation can spring up that
have a certain effectiveness but that have no legal
underpinning. These new forms of regulation work globally
simply as relational regulation backed by coercive
capabilities of the untempered “rule of men” from two
commanding states. More fundamentally, Tusikov’s work

59. TUSIKOV, supra note 53, at 1–2.
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shows how regulation cannot keep up with variegations of
capitalism unless it is agile, innovative,60 and relational.
B. Variegations of Capitalism
Peter Hall and David Soskice’s research defined two
“Varieties of Capitalism,” both based on assemblages of
national policies, including regulatory ones.61 Both varieties
are successful capitalisms. One is the liberal market
capitalism of which the United States and United Kingdom
are lead examples; the second is the coordinated market
capitalism of which Germany or Scandinavia are prominent
examples. Coordinated market capitalism historically has
stronger labor rights. These rights delivered lifetime
employment and capacities of workplace democratic
participation that produced committed employees, then vital
to excellence in sophisticated engineering. An example of this
is the production of better, safer cars in Germany and
Sweden than in the United States or United Kingdom, by
Mercedes Benz in Germany and Volvo in Sweden.62 These
countries also tended, according to Hall and Soskice, to have
antitrust laws that were permissive to collaboration and
technology sharing agreements between firms that
supported sophisticated engineering excellence. Germany
and Scandinavia have not been as successful as the United
States or United Kingdom in investment banking, however.

60. Cristie Ford has produced the most important work on the growing
imperative for regulation to be innovative, and how this can be done in the face
of the dynamism of contemporary capitalism. See CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND
THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE (2017).
61. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) [hereinafter
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM]; Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism
and Institutional Change: A Response to Three Critics, 1 COMP. EUR. POL. 241
(2003); David Hope & David Soskice, Growth Models, Varieties of Capitalism, and
Macroeconomics, 44 POL. & SOC’Y 209 (2016).
62. Both Sweden and Germany earn an unusually high proportion of their
income from high technology exports. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note
61.
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Deregulated labor markets and short-term responsiveness to
increasing shareholder value proved a better fit to the bonus
and burnout culture of twenty-four-hour trading. Though
this may have been the case in the past, the labor markets of
coordinated market economies have become more
deregulated: post-Brexit, Frankfurt may learn to become a
financialization powerhouse, and antitrust policies have
become more globally convergent over time.
The two capitalisms described above can be conceived as
two points that are reasonably close together along a wider
continuum of variegated capitalisms.63 Afghanistan is much
further along that continuum, at the opposite end from these
North Atlantic twin peaks. “Ceasefire capitalism” in
Myanmar64 is closer to Afghanistan than to Western Europe.
The capitalism across the border from Myanmar in the
poorer South-Western corner of China is somewhat
wealthier, but also closer to Myanmar capitalism than to
Western Europe, while some of the great industrial capitalist
regions further to the East of China are more like the
European industrial capitalism of sixty years ago. At the
same time, the information technology and national security
state capitalism of Beijing are more like Silicon Valley and
Pentagon-coordinated national security state capitalism.65
The latter involves competitive tournaments among teams of
cooperative firms to win the contract for the weapons system
of a submarine; then another competition among firms to
build the vessel itself; and another to build IT systems, all
before competing combinations of those firms are pitched
against each other to produce competing integrated designs.
This approach is revealed in the work of Michael Dorf and

63. See Jessop, Capitalist Diversity and Variety, supra note 35; Peck &
Theodore, supra note 35.
64. See Kevin Woods, Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–private Partnerships,
Resource Concessions and Military–state Building in the Burma–China
Borderlands, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 747 (2011).
65. See LINDA WEISS, AMERICA INC.? INNOVATION
NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (2014).
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Charles Sabel,66 and is mixed in with large doses of
industrial espionage by the Chinese national security state.
There is also a massive rural village agricultural capitalism
in China that produces most of what is required to feed its
huge population. It is a hybrid of a feudal past,
collectivization, modern agri-businesses, and state-owned
corporations, that is also tied to traditional rural Confucian
values that the Communist Party embraces in the project of
motivating agricultural workers into patriarchal bonds of
loyalty and harmony. Business in some pockets of China is
more privatized and experiences less Communist Party
micro-management: there are eleven free trade zones which
have no direct customs, lower tax, less red tape, and
supposedly unfiltered internet approximating more liberal
market conditions.67 In contrast, while a large province like
Xinjiang can have a flourishing tourist industry and some
factories, its total domination by the Communist Party and
its deep state surveillance (worst of all its massive
internment system driven by fear of Islamic terror and
Caliphate rhetoric) gives Xinjiang little prospect of
flourishing with any of the sophisticated variegations of
Chinese capitalism. Chinese financialization by banks is
massive, concentrated at nodes (particularly Shanghai and
the entrepot financialization of Hong Kong), and even less
transparent than London and New York financialization.
The main difference is that the two biggest mega banks are
state-owned and are connected to persisting Communist
Party imperatives to directly manage the financial system as
any impending crisis approaches.68 The main point of all this
66. Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).

Constitution

of

Democratic

67. Matt Slater, China Free Trade Zones—Where Are They?, CHINA CHECKUP
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.chinacheckup.com/blogs/articles/china-free-tradezones.
68. ICBC and China Construction Bank hold the two top spots in 2018 on the
Forbes List of the World’s Most Powerful Companies based on sales, profits,
assets, and market value. Global 2000: The World’s Top 25 Companies, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/edjl45efeik/the-worlds-top-25-
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is to say that variegation of capitalism within China is
huge.69 While Chinese capitalism overall is authoritarian
compared to the more liberal capitalism of the United States,
these generalized tropes mask diversity too much.
Turning to the United States, the U.S. economy is
variegated in many ways that mirror Chinese variegation,
but with privately-owned rather than state-owned mega
banks. American variegation is particularly distinguished by
a large underclass economy of illegal immigrants in a service
economy that meets a galaxy of needs of affluent Americans
for cleaners, serving staff in mega-chains from McDonald’s
to Walmart, taxi drivers, carers of the young and the old, and
various underground markets. Casual agricultural workers
are also part of this immigrant precariat.70 The success of
American variegations of capitalism is significantly built on
a foundation of cheap food and services for highly paid
knowledge economy workers in organizations that lead the
world in domains ranging from universities to information
technology.
The United States has a far larger national security state
than any other. Torch-bearers for neoliberalism Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan did not believe in a small state
when it came to national security. They spent big on armies,
police, and on security hardware. Linda Weiss has
persuasively documented a connection between the
neoconservatism that accompanied the neoliberalism of
Reagan’s followers and the booming of the U.S. economy
amidst the ashes of its deindustrialized wastelands.71 Weiss
sees the fact that the United States is a national security
state as key to its economic success in recent decades.
companies/#2147f4654da2 (last visited May 4, 2019).
69. See Chang & Sheppard, supra note 35; Lim, On China’s Growing GeoEconomic Influence, supra note 35; Lim, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,
supra note 35; Mulvad, supra note 35; Peck & Zhang, supra note 35; Zhang &
Peck, supra note 35.
70. See GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011).
71. WEISS, supra note 65.
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Development of the internet was driven forward by the
Pentagon and the British state. Both national economies
benefitted greatly from being early movers in this, as with
early movement into drone and robot technologies in this
century, significantly motivated by ambitions for
surveillance drones and killer robots. America invested
massively in private-public partnerships in information
technology, in particular when this was seen as vital to the
domination of new weapons and surveillance systems. No
scholar has undertaken the careful research of Weiss on
other states that have invested in large ways in the
technology of a national security state—the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, China, Israel, South Africa (during
Apartheid) and Japan (more recently). Yet it does not seem
a wild hypothesis that these countries have also derived
major benefits in building similar variegation into their
capitalism.
While the United States is supposedly an outlier as a
privatized liberal market economy, its public universities, for
example, are massive exporters of higher education services
to global markets. In Australia, also supposedly a liberal
market economy, state universities are almost entirely
responsible for the country’s third biggest export industry
(higher education).72 The United States is like China in
having a balance of publicly-driven and privately-driven
variegations to its export capitalism.
The United States also has other capitalisms. These
include: a micro-corporate venture capitalism that launches
start-ups, some of which later become global tech
corporations; a Silicon Valley capitalism of giants like
Facebook and Google that have already acquired an ability
to regulate globally as revealed by Natasha Tusikov;73

72. See AUSTL. TRADE COMM’N, AUSTRALIA’S EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN FY2017,
at 5 (2017), https://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/5720/Australias_
export_performance_FY2017.pdf.aspx?Embed=Y.
73. TUSIKOV, supra note 53, at 48–49.
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monopoly capitalism grounded in intellectual property rights
that allow monopolists of particular knowledge markets,
such as pharmaceuticals, to exclude competitors;74 growing
“share economies” of cooperatives like Uber and Airbnb that
require minimal infrastructure beyond internet and roads;
and substantial remnants of the old industrial capitalism—
making cars and steel, for example. The United States is the
world leader in the commodification of sport, from American
football to baseball, basketball, tennis, golf, and more.
As variegated as U.S. capitalism is in this narrative, it is
different from authoritarian capitalist societies like China or
Russia,75 and from coordinated market economies like
Germany. Variegated capitalism is partly about the idea that
many different capitalisms co-exist in different spaces/times,
or different markets within one country—a more liberal
market in this sector or space, a more coordinated market in
another, more authoritarian capitalism somewhere else.
While it is clear that it is important to see the variegation
of capitalism and to be careful about sweeping tropes like
“neoliberalism” as a description of America under the
authoritarian interventionism of President Trump, it is also
important to see how bits of the variegation become globally
interdependent. Americans might not approve of the
corporations that provide them with cheap lap-tops and
smart phones by exploiting slave laborers in Congolese
coltan mines. They may disapprove the exploitation of
immiserated factory workers in Bangladesh that delivers
their clothing brands. Yet they increasingly understand that
their ability to purchase cheap clothing and smart phones,
and the profits in their pension funds, depend on this. So
they mostly look away from the comprador symbiosis
between neoliberal and authoritarian capitalism. They

74. PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2003).
75. WILLIAM H. THORNTON & SONGOK HAN THORNTON, TOWARD A GEOPOLITICS
(2012).

OF HOPE 2–5, 49–50
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understand that the corporations that build their pensions
prefer to manufacture in authoritarian countries where they
can pay local managers or Communist Party fixers to deal
with the bribes to make labor or environmental laws go
away. Liberal capitalism in this way digs its own grave and
empowers authoritarian capitalism in its competition with
it.
The arrival of protectionist provocateurs beyond just
Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and the new generation
Eastern European authoritarians raises the question
whether we are approaching peak globalization in the free
movement of goods and services. The authoritarianism of
such politicians suggests that perhaps we have already
passed peak liberalism and peak democracy. There was a
time when Americans thought the fall of Communism would
lead to a liberal Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring and
the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan would lead to a liberal
Middle East and Central Asia. Some thought it was only a
matter of time before there would be another Tiananmen
Square to liberalize China. They thought that the people
power revolution of 1986 in their former Philippines colony
would lead to liberalism, where instead we see
authoritarianism apace with President Duterte. Americans
thought Aung San Su Kyi would liberalize Myanmar—
instead she left it in the hands of genocidal generals and
their authoritarian business cronies who own the banks and
most big business.
The fastest growing economies since the Global
Financial Crisis have not been the neoliberal economies.
They have been large authoritarian capitalist economies like
China and Bangladesh that have been growing at two or
three times the rate of neoliberal economies for decades.
Since the Global Financial Crisis, even more authoritarian
crony capitalist economies in Asia, such as Cambodia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines, have also grown at two or
three times the clip of the western economies. Many of the
biggest countries with populations approaching 100 million
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or more have rejected neoliberalism in favor of their own
version of authoritarian capitalism. Shifts from neoliberal to
authoritarian capitalism have been particularly sharp in
Eastern European economies such as Poland, Hungary and
the former Yugoslavian republics since the Global Financial
Crisis. Some other large economies are doing well as they
move away from authoritarianism toward an intermediate
position between liberal and authoritarian capitalism:
examples of this kind of high growth economy of middling
authoritarianism are Indonesia and India. Others like the
United Arab Emirates and the Philippines are recording
strong growth as they move in the opposite direction toward
more authoritarian hybrids of capitalism. And of course,
American corporate profits boomed in the first two years of
the Trump presidency thanks to his tax cuts and perhaps
even in the short-term to beggar-thy-neighbor aggression in
trade negotiations. India is a key swing state of this contest
among
different
liberal-authoritarian
hybrids.
It
understands that it loses factory investment to Bangladesh
and China because in these more authoritarian states it has
been easier for brands to contrive to evade labor laws or
environmental enforcement.
Now we will turn to consider first if it is possible to
temper the power of variegated forms of financial capitalism,
and second how to regulate labor standards. This will be
considered across the wide global variegations of liberalism
and authoritarianism we have canvassed.
VI. TEMPERED FINANCIALIZATION OF CAPITALISM
A. Banks Taking Over
Banks are hard to regulate because they own much of
everything, including politicians.76 Banker power has a
76. In the United States, for example, financial firm political contributions
grew much more steeply (by 300%) than industrial firms between 1990 and 2008
to rise to the top of the lists of political contributors. Nolan McCarthy, The Politics
of the Pop: The U.S. Response to the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, in
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stronger interest than any other sector of the economy in
holding down the wages share of national income.77 This is
because the only way for policymakers to keep the economy
growing when workers do not have enough money in their
pockets to sustain demand is policy settings that entice
workers into deeper debt than they can sustain when times
get bad. The other alternative is through export growth, that
states are less able to control than debt or wage shares. The
more workers borrow, the higher the profits for banks. This
is why there is a positive correlation between private credit
to GDP ratios in financialized economies and growth in stock
prices.78 While unsustainable debt suits the banks, it is bad
for the rest of us. And unsustainable debt is only good for
banks until there is a crash like 2008. Recent evidence
suggests that a high household debt to GDP ratio may
substantially increase GDP in the short term but
substantially reduce it in the long term, and as that ratio
increases, the dampening impact on long-run growth also
increases.79 Even when there is a crash, smart individuals in
the financial sector move their massive bonuses from the
good times into safe havens, and in the best case even make
a killing by shorting the market before a crash, a crash that
they can more clearly see coming than the rest of us. 80

COPING WITH THE CRISIS: GOVERNMENT REACTIONS TO THE GREAT RECESSION 201,
212 (Nancy Bermeo & Jonas Pontusson eds., 2012).
77. For recent examples of banking power in England lobbying for pay
restraint, see Szu Ping Chan, Mark Carney Says Public Sector Pay Restraint
‘Understandable’ Amid Bank of England Strike, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 3, 2017, 4:10
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/08/03/mark-carney-says-publicsector-pay-restraint-understandable/; Larry Elliott, Brexit Fears Have Triggered
Pay Restraint, Bank of England Official Suggests, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017, 1:34
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/20/brexit-fears-pay-restra
int-bank-of-england.
78. See ADAIR TURNER, BETWEEN DEBT
FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE (rev. ed. 2017).
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79. See Marco J. Lombardi et al., The Real Effects of Household Debt in the
Short and Long Run (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 607, 2017).
80. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE
passim (2015).
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Regardless of the more complex long-term veracity of a
causal relationship between private debt and bank
profitability, the important thing is that banks act as if they
believe the relationship exists by paying employees huge
bonuses for selling more debt. Several econometric studies
suggest an inverted-U relationship between economic growth
and the size of the financial sector. Beyond a tipping point
when financialization gets too dominant relative to the rest
of the economy, economic growth starts to decline as
financialization grows, for reasons that are not yet clear.81
There are many definitions of the recent surge in the
financialization of capitalism. I like Rudolf Hilferding’s82
century-old definition of financialization as increasing
political and economic power of banks and the rentier class
(rentiers are those who live off income from investments in
property or securities rather than from producing anything).
Financial profits as a share of U.S. GDP were about 10
percent in the 1950s.83 By the early 2000s, financial profits
hit an all-time high of about 40 percent of total profits.84 This
figure fell back to less than 30 per cent after the Global

81. See, e.g., Stephen G. Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the
Impact of Finance on Growth (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 381,
2012) (examining this inverted U-shaped trend and tipping point); Gerald E.
Epstein, Financialization, in AN INTRODUCTION TO MACROECONOMICS: A
HETERODOX APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 319 (Louis-Philippe Rochon &
Sergio Rossi eds., 2016); Michael Kumhof et al., Inequality, Leverage, and Crises,
105 AM. ECON. REV. 1217 (2015) (focusing on the indebtedness of poor and middle
income people in conditions of high inequality as a proximate cause of major
crises). Russo, Ricetti, and Gallegati argue that compensating for the negative
impact of high inequality on growth by replacing wages income with debt incomes
in workers’ pockets for fueling demand increases growth in the short-term while
increasing financial instability and the risk of a major unemployment crisis.
Alberto Russo, Luca Riccetti & Mauro Gallegati, Increasing Inequality, Consumer
Credit and Financial Fragility in an Agent Based Macroeconomic Model, 26 J.
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 25, 26 (2016).
82. See Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 173 (2005) (discussing Hilferding’s definition of
financialization).
83. Epstein, supra note 81, at 322.
84. Id.
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Financial Crisis, but has now surged well past 30 per cent
again.85 Financialization is a particularly strong trend in
command economies. In the Forbes 2000 list of the most
powerful corporations in the world for 2018, the first, second,
fifth, ninth, and tenth places are occupied by Communist
Chinese banks that are mostly state owned.86 When
Australians look at their pension portfolios and note that
their biggest investments by far are in the Big Four
Australian banks, they think the Australian economy has
become highly financialized compared with the era when
mining and industrial corporations dominated their
portfolios. In fact, however, foreign banks, particularly
HSBC, JP Morgan, and Citicorp own a hefty proportion of
Australian banks. Australia’s Big Four banks in turn own
more than a quarter of all ASX companies,87 with another
substantial proportion of ASX companies being owned by
smaller Australian banks, foreign banks, or mega insurance
companies.88
B. Micro-Regulation of Financial Capital
While there was an encouraging surge in global
regulation of banks after the 2008 crisis, this represented
quite moderate regulatory growth.89 It was prudent for Basel
to require all large international banks to have higher

85. Id. at 322–23.
86. Global 2000: The World’s Largest Public Companies, FORBES (Jun. 6,
2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#4b8b2a3f335d.
87. James Fernyhough, The Australian Companies You Didn’t Know Were
Owned by the Big Four Banks, NEW DAILY (last updated Mar. 2, 2018, 4:17 PM),
https://thenewdaily.com.au/money/finance-news/2018/03/01/big-four-banksdisguised-subsidiaries/.
88. A particularly major owner has been AMP (Australian Mutual Provident).
Id.
89. For criticism of U.S. regulatory developments in the wake of the crisis, see
ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); Ismail Ertürk, Financialization,
Bank Business Models and the Limits of Post-Crisis Bank Regulation, 17 J.
BANKING REG. 60 (2016).
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reserves as a cushion for future shocks, to be less trusting of
markets to decide on the veracity of financial products, and
wise to seek national commitments to curtail the
irresponsible activities of financial institutions. That said,
financial regulation cannot be effective unless it is highly
variegated and adaptive to context and to new financial
engineering innovations. One salutary lesson of the Global
Financial Crisis in this respect came from Poland. Polish
financial regulators were without hubris in the mid-2000s;
they adopted the view that they were not a financially
sophisticated economy and their regulatory capacities were
less developed than in big economies.90 While it could make
sense in Britain and the United States for regulators to
license banks that traded in complex derivatives, it was more
prudent for Poland to tell its banks that it would not renew
their licenses if they traded significantly in complex financial
products that their regulators did not understand. These
decisions left Poland’s banks less touched by derivatives
tainted with sliced and diced U.S. sub-prime mortgages than
in the rest of Europe, and Poland recovered from 2008 with
higher growth rates than any other European country.91
Many individual banks in Canada, Australia, and Asia
(where so many had been burnt by the 1998 Asian Financial

90. The Polish financial regulators managed risks instead of shifting them.
Godziszewski and Kruszka point out that unlike in more sophisticated European
banking systems, Polish banks were required to verify the incomes of those
taking loans. See Bartosz Godziszewski & Michal Kruszka, Stability of Banking
System in Poland and Activity of the KNF—Polish Financial Supervision
Authority, CESIFO F., Spring 2013, at 29, available at https://www.cesifogroup.de/DocDL/forum1-13-focus5.pdf. The authors note that “[d]espite weak
labour market conditions, the number of non-performing loans did not rise
sharply [during and after the crisis],” and Polish banks had “virtually no OTC
(over-the-counter) derivatives.” Id. at 33. Polish banks remained well capitalized
during the crisis; none failed or required recapitalization using public funds. Id.
91. See Fred Pleitgen & Catriona Davies, How Poland Became Only EU
Nation to Avoid Recession, CNN (June 29, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com
/2010/WORLD/europe/06/29/poland.economy.recession/index.html; Dominique
Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, IMF, Address at the Warsaw School of
Economics: After the Global Financial Crisis—The Road Ahead (Mar. 29, 2010),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp032910.
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Crisis) adopted the same humility as the Polish regulators.
In the case of Australia, there was a high level of
securitization of housing loans by the big banks, but these
were overwhelmingly Australian loans which were wellunderstood and understood to be prudent by world standards
in 2008. Even at Lehman Brothers in the 2000s there were a
number of prominent humble senior bankers who thought
the firm was becoming too highly leveraged into too many
derivatives that were not sufficiently transparent in their
relationship to complex risks in real estate markets. These
people were marginalized, with their views seen as a risk to
short-run profits and bonuses; in some instances, they left
because no one was listening to their pleas to temper the
hubris.92
It is the most sophisticated, aggressive, bonus-driven
and liberal finance markets in New York and London that
are most difficult to temper. They pose the deepest global
risks. Yet even within the United States there are more and
less aggressive, more and less innovative and risk-taking
institutions. In tempering banking power, one size cannot fit
all. Responsive regulatory theory suggests that a relational
species of regulation with a significant portion of restorative
justice can be a helpful first port of call for strengthening the
hand of the temperate, ethical insiders before they are
pushed towards the door.93
I have argued that the global financial crisis might have
been prevented this way.94 The FBI from 2004, if not
considerably earlier, was seeing a great deal of evidence of
an epidemic of mortgage fraud in fraud monitoring

92. Rear Vision: The Legacy of the Global Financial Crisis, ABC RN (Sept. 16,
2018, 12:05 PM) (audio download available at http://www.abc.net.au
/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-legacy-of-the-global-financialcrisis/10195876).
93. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10;
Braithwaite, supra note 48.
94. Braithwaite, supra note 48.
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databases.95 FBI leaders suffered from the pathology of being
a prosecutorial rather than a preventive regulator. The FBI
did not see it as a prosecutorial priority to confront the petty
frauds of lenders who said they had a job when they did not.
Had they embraced a more preventive orientation, they
might have discussed with prudential regulators whether
this massive upsurge in petty fraud causing housing loan
defaults was a red flag of risk for American finance.
Eventually they might have found that investors on Wall

95. Nguyen and Pontell made a strong case that corporate crime played an
important role in these waves of mortgage fraud. Particularly telling in Nguyen
and Pontell’s account was the 2006 Federal Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) report of a 1,411% increase in mortgage-related suspicious
activity reports between 1997 and 2005, 66% of which involved material
misrepresentation or false documents. Then another 44% increase was reported
between 2005 and 2006. A BasePoint Analytics analysis of three million loans,
which indicated that 70% of early payment defaults had fraudulent
misrepresentations on their original loan applications, was another early
warning signal discussed by Nguyen and Pontell that the mortgage issue was a
crime problem. These data also demonstrated that it was a consequential
problem, as the loans with fraudulent misrepresentations were five times as
likely to go into default. The Federal Bureau of Investigation began issuing public
warnings in 2004, claiming that it was seeing a spike in mortgage fraud cases in
the mid-2000s. Even earlier than that, a more abstract early warning drew on
the lessons of the history of the savings and loans debacle from Nguyen and
Pontell and fellow scholars such as Bill Black. Of course, other layers of causation
were found in the structures of the derivatives market, the bonus culture on Wall
Street, the captured ratings agencies that failed to do their job, the structural
imbalances of American indebtedness to China to pay for Chinese exports to the
United States, and the defective quantitative risk models applied by the financial
industry. Yet Nguyen and Pontell’s emphasis on the proximate causes in
mortgage fraud is well-placed because the deeper layers of causation were much
harder to fix. See Tomson H. Nguyen & Henry N. Pontell, Mortgage Origination
Fraud and the Global Economic Crisis: A Criminological Analysis, 9
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 591 (2010); WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB
A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE
S&L INDUSTRY (2005); Interview by Bill Moyers with William K. Black on PBS
(Apr. 3, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal
/04032009/transcript1.html); Kitty Calavita, Robert Tillman & Henry N. Pontell,
The Savings and Loan Debacle, Financial Crime, and the State, 23 ANN. REV.
SOC. 19 (1997); Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC (May, 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice; PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN
OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); JUSTIN O’BRIEN,
ENGINEERING A FINANCIAL BLOODBATH (2009); FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS
GREED: HOW DECEIT AND GREED CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003).
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Street who were looking at the same data were setting
themselves for a killing with “The Big Short” of those
securitized bad loans.96 Relational regulators might then
have sat down with the banks that were approving the
greatest numbers of defaulting loans and asked them why
they were so much worse than other banks and what could
they do to repair this harm. We know now that this would
have revealed a systemic pattern of “liar loans” in which
working class people were groomed to exaggerate their
incomes. Then these banks sliced and diced the loans into
securities and sold unmanaged risks far and wide. At the
very least, the depth of the global recession could have been
reduced through this kind of relational regulation, a type of
regulation that did not waste time on prosecutions with
cooperating banks but focused instead on preventing evergrowing numbers of poor people being foisted with debts they
could not sustain. Yes, more bankers should have gone to
prison by 2019, but in 2004 the priority was relational
prevention of more people being bankrupted into poverty.
With a stringent enough focus of regulatory pressure,
most banks would likely have played ball with relational
regulation by hiring independent auditors to report honestly
on what was going wrong with their lending practices. Most
banks probably would have voluntarily complied with
regulatory demands to reform their lending practices,
dispense with culpable brokers, discipline their own staff,
and repair damage by helping to restructure loans that were
impossible for poor people to repay. Many, however, would
have refused to do these things and stonewalled regulators.
Financial regulators have no shortage of powers in such
circumstances to march in and do their own audit of bad
loans. When this escalation did not evoke cooperation and deescalation to relational regulation, they could escalate
further by starting to launch prosecutions against banks and
individual executives for fraud. If cooperation then occurred,

96. See LEWIS, supra note 80.
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prosecutions could be deferred, contingent on the quality of
the reforms and the offer of help to poor lenders who were in
trouble. If compassionate support for struggling families was
not even forthcoming after that, regulators could have made
an example of these banks by securing mug shots of their
chief executives on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.
Responsive regulation underwrites the presumptive
preference for relational and compassionate regulation with
escalation to tough stuff at the peak of the regulatory
pyramid.97 In the very worst cases of fraud and intransigence
to reform, corporate capital punishment is a more robust
remedy before the collapse of banks: withdrawal of their
license, state takeover, and restructuring of the bank’s
affairs.
C. Responsive Structural Regulation of Financial Capital
After the event, in 2008 and 2009, financial institutions
had collapsed as a result of their folly. What then? It follows
from the financialization of capitalism that the largest banks
in big economies can be too big to fail. The U.S. government
made the correct decision in saving Bear Stearns and other
systemically important financial institutions from collapse.
It probably should have gone further and also used taxpayer
funds to save Lehman Brothers from going under, because
that was the immediate trigger of a global freezing up of
capital markets. Likewise, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown did the right thing in bailing out his big banks. Yet in
the long run, political leaders must not privatize capitalism’s
profits and socialize its losses. In one important sense, the
United Kingdom (and other European governments such as
Germany’s) did a better job than the United States, because
Britain insisted on taxholder equity in failing banks like
Lloyds. These shares could be sold when the market
inevitably rose again.98 Even if the British taxpayer might

97. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93, at 4–5, 35–41.
98. Andrew MacAskill, Lloyds New Era Begins as Government Sells Off Final
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sell these shares at a loss, one solution is making up the
shortfall later by a special tax on banks of the kind Australia
imposed in 2017.99 In a related way, if China and other
authoritarian capitalist states are willing to pull socialist
levers to deal proactively with crises, and neoliberal
economies like the United Kingdom and United States are
not, it is the authoritarian capitalist economies that may
survive in the long run.
In their own ways, these governments showed that only
resort to temporary socialist solutions can save capitalism in
a major crisis. Obama was quite assertively socialist when
he bailed out General Motors. General Motors (and Chrysler)
came to him in 2008 with the message that he had no
alternative but to bail them out. Presidents had done this in
past crises, where they were later rewarded by fat campaign
contributions as the auto industry returned to profit. Obama
behaved differently than past Presidents in 2008. He did
deploy vast taxpayer funds to temporarily socialize the auto
industry’s losses. But in the process, he fired the General
Motors CEO Rick Wagoner.100 He announced that he wanted
renewed top management that would give the auto industry
states of Michigan and Ohio a sustainable future by greening
the industry. This was an apt response to sclerosis in a
business that had learnt it was cheaper to invest in political
lobbying than in innovation. By 2013, Obama had seen the
release of a General Motors environmental sustainability
report card that revealed some progress toward greener
factories that produce greener cars. This enterprise has
Shares, REUTERS (May 17, 2017, 2:20 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uklloyds-sale/lloyds-new-era-begins-as-government-sells-off-final-sharesidUKKCN18D0GZ.
99. Carrington Clarke, Federal Budget 2017: How the New Bank Tax Will
Work, ABC NEWS (May 10, 2017, 12:29 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/storystreams/federal-budget-2017/2017-05-10/federal-budget-2017-bank-taxexplained/8513264.
100. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Lays Down Terms for Auto
Bailout,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
30,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com
/2009/03/30/business/30auto.html.
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continued: despite Donald Trump’s avowals to kill off
Obama’s sustainability agenda,101 General Motors made a
commitment in 2016 that it would source all electrical power
for its 350 operations in 59 countries with renewable energy
by 2050.102 Partly because of these governance changes,
American autos became more competitive with European
and Asian cars. Voters of Michigan and Ohio were grateful
to Obama in the 2012 Presidential election for saving their
economies.
Neither Obama nor Brown were tough enough with
banks that by 2019 had returned to impressive profitability.
It would have been just and economically sound to introduce
something like the 2017 Australian special tax on banks to
force British and U.S. banks to pay their taxpayers back for
their generous support during the years of crisis. This would
have forced banks to cover their externalities. The problem
is the banks have political power to which cautious social
democrats like Obama, the Clintons, Brown, and Tony Blair
have always deferred. These politicians scorned the “bankbashing populism” of social democrats like Bernie Sanders,
Elizabeth Warren, and Jeremy Corbyn. But if Hilary Clinton
had moved more in that principled, apparently “populist”
direction, she might have defeated Donald Trump. Had she
focused on how Obama won Michigan and Ohio by saving
auto industry jobs (but not the GM CEO Wagoner) she might
have fared better. In the longer run of the Obama
administration, while the President’s Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel said “you never want a serious crisis to go to
waste,”103 the opportunity presented by the crisis was, after
101. Joe Arvai, Why Trump’s Vow to Kill Obama’s Sustainability Agenda Will
Lead Business to Step in and Save It, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 15, 2016, 9:55
PM), https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-vow-to-kill-obamas-sustainability
-agenda-will-lead-business-to-step-in-and-save-it-68616.
102. Press Release, General Motors, GM Commits to 100 Percent Renewable
Energy by 2050 (Sept. 14, 2016), https://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm
/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2016/sep/0914-renewableenergy.html. 2050 is not so fast, critics can rightly point out.
103. Wall Street Journal, Rahm Emanuel on the Opportunities of Crisis,
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all, wasted. The administration eventually succumbed to the
hegemony of the financialization of capitalism, sustained an
overly-indebted economy, kept wages down, and missed the
opportunity for a Green New Deal.104
In Australia, it took a conservative Prime Minister,
Malcolm Turnbull, who was struggling against a social
democratic tide and who himself had been a super-rich
investment banker, to realize how hated banks were and
impose the special one-off punitive tax on Australia’s superprofitable banks in 2017. He also pushed back on the deep
resistance of his own Liberal Party elite to establish a Royal
Commission
into
Misconduct
in
the
Banking,
105
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry,
called
for by the National Party (a conservative, rural, farmer’s
party), the Labor Party, and the Greens. A retired High
Court judge used the extraordinary powers of royal
commissions in Australia to reveal deeply entrenched
practices of financial abuse against disadvantaged
consumers, farmers, and middle-class consumers alike.
The securities regulator (the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission) responded to criticism of it by the
Royal Commission by planting a resident member of its
enforcement staff permanently inside the four big banks and
AMP, the largest insurance company (all of which were outed
for
exploitative
law-breaking
during
Commission
106
hearings). As in the United States and United Kingdom,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 19, 2008) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mzcbXi1Tkk.
104. See KYLA TIENHAARA, GREEN KEYNESIANISM AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2018); PHILIP A. WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE
RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS (2015); Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner,
Opinion, Corporate America Is Suppressing Wages for Many Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate-americasuppressing-wages.html.
105. ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov

.au/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 26, 2019).
106. See Gareth Hutchens, Banking Royal Commission: All You Need To
Know—So
Far,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
19,
2018,
6:42
PM),
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Australian citizens have extremely low trust in the integrity
of financial institutions.107 Citizens have been justified in
distrusting banks. Wave after wave of popular outrage
against Australian banks across the past forty years has
afflicted the banks with one high-profile public enquiry into
the Australian financial system after another which revealed
terrible abuses,108 regulatory failure, and recommended
regulatory reform in response.109 Paradoxically, Australia’s
endless cycle of scandal110 has served it reasonably well.
Modest degrees of ethical renewal, regulatory renewal of
prevention strategies, and enforcement renewal, occurs in
each wave of inquiry111—even as seemingly pro-business,
pro-banker appointments are made to conduct each inquiry
by politicians fearful of the money power of banks. Renewal
is always very partial and inadequate. Banks move forward
to support the politicians who were against “bank bashing”
and cut off those who did not.
Nevertheless, there is compelling evidence that as more

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/20/banking-royalcommission-all-you-need-to-know-so-far.
107. Emily Cadman, A Decade of Banks Behaving Badly Is Being Laid Bare in
Australia, BLOOMBERG (29 Apr. 2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2018-04-29/decade-of-banks-behaving-badly-laid-bare-in-australi
an-inquiry.
108. The abuses revealed after the collapse of Australia’s then-largest insurer,
HIH, in 2001 were particularly shocking (its chief executive went to prison). For
information specific to HIH, see Claudio Damiani et al., The HIH Claims Support
Scheme, in THE TREASURY ECONOMIC ROUNDUP 37 (Australian Treasury, 2015),
https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/06/Roundup_Issue1_2015_Combined.pdf.
109. For a recent, non-exhaustive summary of Australia’s financial services
inquiries, see Thomas Clarke, A History of Failed Reform: Why Australia Needs
a Banking Royal Commission, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 11, 2016, 4:10 PM),
https://theconversation.com/a-history-of-failed-reform-why-australia-needs-abanking-royal-commission-64803.
110. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION (1978).
111. This is the recipe in Sherman’s book for scandal to lead to reform, as
opposed to hunkering down until the adverse publicity blows over then return to
corrupted business as normal. See id.
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layers have been put in the enforcement pyramids of
Australian financial regulators, they have accomplished
genuinely more transparent markets (compared to, for
example, New Zealand’s, in one analysis).112 This fits with
the international literature showing that it is not so much
high levels of regulatory deterrence that prevent corporate
crime, but use of a strengthened, diverse regulatory mix.113
There is also evidence that relational regulation of shocking
financial crimes against consumers has delivered on the one
hand helpful regulatory reform, and helped the

112. Ka Wai Choi et al., Responsive Enforcement Strategy and Corporate
Compliance with Disclosure Regulations (Austl. Nat’l Univ. & Macquarie Univ.,
Working Paper, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722923. This analysis showed
that as successive regulatory crises and law reform surges progressively equipped
ASIC with new layers of more varied arrows in its law enforcement quiver the
effectiveness of ASIC enforcement progressively increased. The difference-indifference analysis with the impact of New Zealand securities and financial
market regulation reinforced this result. The study investigated the effectiveness
of securities regulation in making markets more transparent to investors and
therefore more efficient and hopefully less prone to the burst of artificial bubbles.
The ASIC outcome of concern was change in financial analysts’ information
environment and market liquidity. Hence, Choi and his colleagues measured the
impact of the Australian and New Zealand financial disclosure regimes by
variables such as reduction in analysts’ forecast errors, forecast dispersion, bidask spread, and increase in the turnover rate from the market liquidity test. The
ASIC budget and enforcement intensity (measured by prosecution counts) helped
analysts to reduce forecast errors for future profits, with the responsive
regulation effect increasing predictive accuracy over and above those impacts on
the integrity of markets. The leverage in such data was formidable with an
Australian sample of 148,498 firm-month observations (with each observation
based on the median for a number of analysts) and a New Zealand sample of
116,585. Not only does this study have the strength of a multi-construct multimethod move to a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis of all major
corporations in an economy on an outcome that securities enforcement is
designed to deliver, combined with a difference-in-difference analysis of two
whole economies, it also delivers a larger number of observations than normally
experienced with empirical socio-legal research.
113. See Natalie Schell‐ Busey et al., What Works? A Systematic Review of
Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2016); John
Braithwaite, In Search of Donald Campbell: Mix and Multimethods, 15
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2016) (discussing Schell-Busey et al., supra). On
the theory of why this might be so, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
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disadvantaged victims of those transgressions.114 Critics
rightly point out that, as in the United States and United
Kingdom, there have not been enough criminal prosecutions
of bankers.115 While this is the case, it is important to note
also the evidence that “enforceable undertakings” negotiated
through relational regulation are more effective than critics
who push for consistently punitive measures like
imprisonment allege.116 So while Australians have good
reasons for thinking poorly of banks, the frequency of
Australia’s cycles of scandal and reform have actually made
its banks rather better than in many other countries. More
importantly, quite unlike in other countries, the political
hold of the banks has been significantly lessened not only on
the social democratic side of politics, but on the conservative
side; not only on the authoritarian populist right (One
Nation) and the rural right (the National Party), but also in
the neoliberal party of business donors (the Liberal Party).
No Australian bank has been bailed out by taxpayers
this century, nor in the final years of the last century. The
Labor government did promise that it would socialize bank
losses if it had to in 2008, and provided an unlimited
government guarantee for all bank deposits to discourage
withdrawals and to restore confidence to depositing and
lending. It ratcheted up deficit spending more aggressively
than all the economies that were in deeper trouble in 2008
114. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); Christine Parker, Restorative Justice in Business
Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Use of
Enforceable Undertakings, 67 MOD. L. REV. 209 (2004).
115. See Patrick Durkin, ‘Why Me?’ Allan Fels Scolds ANZ Bank after Cartel
Charges, FIN. REV. (June 4, 2018, 11:00 PM), https://www.afr.com
/business/banking-and-finance/why-me-allan-fels-scolds-anz-bank-after-cartelcharges-20180604-h10xmx; Ian Verrender, Crime and Misdemeanours: A Tale of
Two Law Enforcement Agencies, ABC NEWS (June 3, 2018, 4:21 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-04/crime-as-misdemeanours-tale-of-twolaw-enforcement-agencies/9830742.
116. MARINA NEHME ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW, MKTS. & REGULATION, UNIV. OF NEW
SOUTH WALES, THE GENERAL DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF ENFORCEABLE
UNDERTAKINGS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CREDIT PROVIDERS (2018).
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and 2009. As a result, the Australian economy grew in every
quarter of the Global Financial Crisis,117 grew more than any
OECD country in that period,118 and indeed has grown every
quarter for a record in the developed world of 28 years.119
Joseph Stiglitz described the Australian policy response to
the financial crisis with a little hyperbole as “one of the most
impressive economic policies I have seen, ever.”120
Despite these positives, a good argument can be made
that (as argued by the principal author of the architecture of
the contemporary Australian financial system, Paul
Keating)121Australian banking is controlled with excessive
oligopoly by its big four banks, even for the comparative
smallness of its economy. Keating believes that competition
policy has been too permissive in allowing these banks to
take over their most threatening competitors (such as the St.
George Building Society and Aussie Home Loans), and that
contestability from foreign banks has not been robust enough
in a political game sewn up by the big four.122 Australia’s
chief of competition regulation during the 1990s, Allan
Fels,123 has urged that a regulatory separation of deposit
taking and investment advice to customers is required.124

117. Edmund Tang, Australia Has Experienced the Longest Period of Economic
Growth in the Developed World, AUSTL. TRADE & INVESTMENT COMMISSION BLOG
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.austrade.gov.au/News/Economic-analysis/australia
-has-experienced-the-longest-economic-growth-among-major-developed-world.
118. OECD, OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 252 (2010).
119. The last quarter of negative growth in Australia was June 1991. See Tang,
supra note 117.
120. Quoted in WAYNE SWAN, THE GOOD FIGHT: SIX YEARS, TWO PRIME
MINISTERS AND STARING DOWN THE GREAT RECESSION (2014).
121. Australian Treasurer from 1983 to 1991 and Prime Minister from 1991 to
1996.
122. Eric Johnston, Banks Given Too Much Power, Says Keating, THE SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/business/
banks-given-too-much-power-says-keating-20090922-g0km.html.
123. Chair of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission from its
inception in 1995 until June 30th, 2003.
124. Jessica Irvine et al., ‘Stamp Out This Behaviour’—Banks Should Not
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That is, banks should not be able to put their depositors into
investment products in which the bank concerned is itself an
investor. Fels also believes that both of Australia’s financial
regulators, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
have been too reluctant to launch criminal prosecutions and
put bankers in jail. This is a fair comment. During Fels’ era
as Chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, this body took many tough enforcement actions
to compensate for the consumer protection weaknesses of the
financial regulators, though mainly through enforceable
undertakings that included compensation for consumers,
financial penalties, and mandated compliance reforms
rather than through criminal prosecutions.125
When regulators have failed to prevent a financial crisis,
the regulatory pyramid shown to banks in the aftermath
could be useful in responding to failures of post-crisis reform.
One good regulatory change could be the separation of
deposit-taking from investment advice, or at least from any
advice to invest in a product in which the bank is implicated.
This could escalate to total separation of deposit-taking
banking from all investment banking, as the United States
put in place with the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act126 during the
New Deal. More recently, John McCain and Elizabeth
Offer Advice Says Fels, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:16 PM),
https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/stamp-out-thisbehaviour-banks-should-not-offer-advice-says-fels-20180418-p4zacb.html.
125. Regulatory redundancy and inefficiency can have a virtue in checking and
balancing regulatory capture against the power of big banks. I was able to observe
this during ten years serving as a part-time Commissioner on Fels’s Commission.
After Fels’s time at the ACCC helm ended in 2003, a memorandum of
understanding was developed that defined more clearly which rip-offs of
consumers would be ACCC and which would be ASIC matters. There was
efficiency in this. But because of the correct criticism that ASIC has always had
a less robust enforcement culture than the ACCC, part of the policy debate
around the Royal Commission was whether the ACCC should be re-weaponized
to prosecute banks.
126. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.
See generally Glass-Steagall Act, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/glass_steagall_act.asp.
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Warren were among those who drafted a bill for a “21st
Century Glass-Steagall Act,” which sought a separation of
deposit-taking activities from investment banks, hedge
funds, insurance, and private equity firms within a five-year
transition timeframe. The incentives behind the act were
twofold: to drive de-monopolization in the banking sector and
to enable banks to be more secure and trusted by depositors.
In Australia, as everywhere, the selection of the best
regulatory structure should be responsive to the
particularities of histories of failure. The optimum number
of big banks also depends on the size of an economy. At this
point in Australia’s financial history, a good case can be
made that it would be better off with five big banks than
four—it can be significantly harder to effect market collusion
in oligopolies when just one new oligopolist is added.127 For
this reason, a good option for Australia could be to insert the
option of state takeover of one of the smaller competitors to
the big four into its post-crisis pyramid. The government
could invest taxpayer funds into this fringe competitor to
build it into a state-owned big fifth bank. Its charter could
increase the competitiveness of the banking system by
undercutting the interest rates, beating the quality of
service, from the big four, and promising better compliance
with consumer protection laws. The big fifth bank could later
be privatized. There would be no need to rush to do this
before a good sale price could be optimized for taxpayers
because the evidence does not suggest that economies
perform worse with higher percentages of banking in state
hands.128 The fiscal benefit to taxpayers when the shares
127. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93, at 139; see also ERIC RASMUSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION (1989); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J.
POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
128. See Thomas Marois, State-Owned Banks and Development: Dispelling
mainstream myths, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE AND THE MENA REGION 52 (M. Mustafa
Erdogdu & Bryan Christiansen eds., 2016); Svetlana Addrianova et al., Is
Government Ownership of Banks Really Harmful to Growth? (Brunel Univ. Dep’t
of Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 09-20, May 2009). Countries with a high
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were sold would likely be huge, given the excess profitability
of the oligopolistic Australian banks. The long-term legacy of
the period of reform would be a private big five, instead of
four, and hopefully an improved regulatory culture129 and a
diminished Australian national debt.
This particular reform would be deeply resisted in liberal
Australia because it is “socialist,” even if only temporarily so.
That does not mean it is pointless for social democrats and
Greens130 to signal it as an option if banks continue to behave
so poorly and continue to lose the trust of the people. It would
be good politics to do so. Despite the suitability of this idea
to an Australian context, a policy option like this in a U.S.
regulatory pyramid could never make sense even as a
political option, nor perhaps as good policy because of the
American variegation of financialization.131 The mix needed
for one country, one sector of capitalism within a country, one
period of its history, will always be different from another

percentage of public ownership of banking such as Germany are inclined, rightly
or wrongly, to see this more as a strength than a weakness. See, e.g., Daniel
Detzer, Financial Systems in Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Banking Systems
in the EU, 2 INTERECONOMICS 56 (2014).
129. See Meidinger, supra note 26.
130. The Greens have signaled it as a political option they favor. See Amy
Remeikis, Which Bank? Richard Di Natale Says Australia Needs a ‘People’s
Bank’, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/australia-news/2018/apr/04/which-bank-richard-di-natale-says-australia-needsa-peoples-bank (covering Richard Di Natale’s National Press Club address in
April 2018).
131. It is nevertheless true that U.S. state governments have often sought to
sustain competitive pressure from smaller banks in their state by depositing
state government funds in them. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93, at 139.
Ayres and Braithwaite advocate a monopsony standard for this kind of
governmental partial-industry intervention. The United States would not meet
this standard with public funding for a competing bank, but Australia quite likely
would. Private sector firms and defense departments alike act to create a second
or third source when they are not getting enough competition in their supply
chain. A monopsony standard provides a limiting principle on when the state
should not intervene (when private monopsony would not). In economic
circumstances where a monopsonist private corporation would support the
creation of a competitor for second-sourcing, states should also consider it. See id.
ch. 5.
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country, another sector, another time. Our job in the
academy is to eschew the political realism that assumes the
banks will always be too politically powerful to allow
anything like Figure 1. Our job is to prepare for the next
crisis, for perhaps a really shocking one during which fascists
capitalize by attacking “Jewish bankers.” Our job is to ensure
that the future John McCains and Elizabeth Warrens of a
more principled financialization of capitalism have some
ideas in their top drawer for deeper reform.
Figure 1 displays these options for an Australian postcrisis pyramid of structural responses to lost confidence in
banks.
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FIGURE 1: Options for an Australian post-crisis pyramid of
structural responses to lost confidence

The bottom five rungs of this pyramid have in effect
already been put in place in Australia. The next two rungs
up have been under discussion in the response to the Royal
Commission, but are unlikely to happen during the current
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reform cycle. The top two rungs are decidedly intervention
steps too far for Australian politics today, especially given
the country’s past (of a Labor government that lost power
and stayed out of power for 23 years after it sought to
nationalize all banks).132 The inappropriateness of the design
of this enforcement pyramid in the United States, United
Kingdom, or the distinctive context of Poland133 discussed
above confirms the imperative for variegated responses to
different catastrophes of different capitalisms.
VII. TEMPERING THE PROFIT SHARE
The last section demonstrated how banks mobilize their
influence to structurally increase the profit share of finance
by pushing debt upon people. To do this, they engage in
consumer fraud, which can become systemic. Bankers think
this fraud can sustain the demand that keeps capitalism
pumping. The alternative solution to secure the same
outcome—reducing debt and increasing wages—is
unattractive to finance capital. In this section, I explore
reducing debt and increasing wages as the alternative that
can make life better for poorer people, while also more
effectively proofing capitalism against crashes.
Banks share interests with their most powerful
corporate clients in that they both seek to suppress global
regulation of labor standards. Natasha Tusikov’s
Chokepoints reveals that in China, manufacturers received
ten dollars in direct payments for wages per iPad, which was
a wages share of 1.8 percent of the value of an iPad.134 In this
context, we also know production for Western brands is
132. This was the Chifley Labor government in 1949. The Mitterrand
government also had to reverse its disastrous foray into nationalizing France’s
major banks in 1982, but survived after abandoning the policy.
133. Though Poland did have a state bank during the Global Financial Crisis
that accounted for twenty percent of the banking market. It helped considerably
with crisis management by pumping up lending in the public interest when the
private Polish banks were pulling back from lending.
134. TUSIKOV, supra note 53, at 9.
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moving from China because Chinese wages are getting too
high. Apple could pay its manufacturing workers fifty
percent more and thereby increase the price of iPads by less
than one percent. Bearing in mind that better paid workers
might be better workers, Apple can afford to pay a living
wage without greatly denting its profits. On the optimistic
side, this datum reveals that industrial capital does not have
as strong an interest in oppressive suppression of the wages
share that finance capital has.
Economists used to be almost as ambivalent as bankers
about increasing the wages share of national income. There
is considerable consensus among economists now, however,
that the wage share of national incomes has fallen too far to
reliably sustain long-run job creation, especially when
inevitable shocks deliver downturns. Sustainable long-term
demand that keeps unemployment shocks at bay requires
higher average wages than we see in economies like the
United States.135 The best way to accomplish this with social
justice is to increase minimum wages. This would also push
up the incomes of those earning above the minimum wage,
as they and their unions demand a correspondingly higher
salary to accord with their higher skill levels, education, or
experience. Statistically, declining unionization and
declining minimum wages in the United States account for
the majority of its rise in wage inequality during the past
half century.136 At the same time, a political strategy of
raising minimum wages is the best way of ensuring that
most of the benefit of a shift from the profit share to the
wages share of national income would go to the poorest
135. See Eckhard Hein & Nina Dodig, Finance-Dominated Capitalism,
Distribution, Growth and Crisis—Long-Run Tendencies, in THE DEMISE OF
FINANCE-DOMINATED CAPITALISM: EXPLAINING THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISES 54 (Eckhard Hein, Daniel Detzer & Nina Dodig eds., 2015); BRINK LINDSEY
& STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH
THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY (2017).
136. SHELLEY MARSHALL, LIVING WAGE: REGULATORY SOLUTIONS TO INFORMAL
(2019). The discussion in the
following paragraphs draws heavily on this work by Marshall.
AND PRECARIOUS WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 14
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workers and to women of the precariat in particular.
Securing this result is difficult without an
internationalist struggle for a living wage that complements
national policy, national campaigns, and local campaigns.
Shelley Marshall has brilliantly argued how such a
campaign for a global living wage might be conducted
pragmatically and incrementally. Her strategy requires the
trade union movement to reinvent its relevance. She
suggests that unions shift from focus on national campaigns
to a global social movement for wage justice. In Errol
Meidinger’s terms, this requires the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions to show the lead and
pull the levers to build a more globalized “regulatory
community”137 for interscalar global and local wage justice.
A centerpiece of the Marshall strategy would be an
International Labor Organization (ILO) agreement for
signatory countries to increase their minimum wage each
year, with the countries with the lowest minimum wages in
Purchasing Power Parity terms (adjusted for local living
costs) agreeing to the highest annual percentage increases.
Perhaps these might be two percent in real terms.138 Unions
in wealthy countries would shift some of their resources to
unions in very poor countries so that those unions could
support the campaigns of politicians who commit to
increasing minimum wages. Relatively modest contributions
from unions in wealthy countries like the United States and
Germany could buy a great deal of political campaigning and
worker political mobilization in the world’s poorest
economies. So might crowd funding in rich countries. For
unions in rich countries this investment would be an indirect
strategy for ratcheting up minimum wages in their own
country. An alternative would be to design the ratchet based
on the size of the gap between the minimum wage and the

137. See Meidinger, supra note 26.
138. Some sentences here and in the paragraphs that follow are taken from my
Foreword to Marshall’s (2019) book. MARSHALL, supra note 136, at vii-ix.
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median wage.
Marshall’s global strategy is about workers of all
countries helping one another to ratchet up minimum wages
and therefore the wages share of income across all countries.
Each national success would help ratchet up minimum
wages in all other nations. One way this could happen could
be as follows. Assume a regime where the countries with the
lowest ratios between minimum and median wages are
required to implement the biggest increase in their minimum
wage; an intermediate group of countries by an intermediate
percentage; and the countries with the highest ratios of
minimum to median wages are only required to implement
the lowest percentage increase. After a number of years
being required to make the biggest increases to real
minimum wages, the worst countries would no longer find
themselves at the bottom of this triage. As some countries
move up from the middle to the highest group, others will be
pushed down to the middle group. Then the progress in
middle group countries will ratchet up minimum wages in
the countries that start with the highest minimum wages.
Likewise, improvement in the worst group of counties would
ratchet up improvement in the middle group as members of
that group are pushed down into the lowest group. In the
next year those countries that were formerly in the middle
group will have to accomplish a bigger increase. So, the lower
group ratchets up the middle group and the middle group
ratchets up the higher minimum wage group over time. This
is the politics of what makes it sensible for unions in the
highest wage countries to fund campaigns in lowest wage
countries to sign up to the regime.
Once the campaign had succeeded in getting a critical
mass of countries to sign up to the ILO Global Living Wage
Agreement, campaigning would shift from supporting
political leaders who lead ratification campaigns to targeting
hold-outs and saboteurs of the regime who reduce minimum
wages. Regime saboteurs in Shelley’s model would be
targeted punitively by consumer and union boycotts, Fair
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Trade decertification, strikes at multinational companies
who invest in black-listed low wage countries, and a global
fund to support strikers campaigning for a Living Wage in
non-signatory countries. Once many international
companies had agreed to renounce new investment in blacklisted countries, and once many of the most powerful states
had signed the agreement, then they would have a strategic
trade interest in persuading competing firms and companies
to follow them rather than undercut them.139
Transnational corporations would be lobbied to sign a
pledge to do business preferentially with “Living Wage List”
suppliers and states. The strategy would target the most
inegalitarian of political parties and firms, but only after a
long period of regime-building in which none are levied with
punishment but targeted instead with relational regulation
and political rewards for joining the regime. Only those
states and firms that are particularly corrupt and persistent
in their non-enforcement of minima should be punished. If
the worst few countries and firms were successfully targeted
every few years, in the next few years the regime could raise
the bar by targeting the next worst few firms and the next
worst few countries. By this point in the evolution of such a
regime, the majority of producer organizations might even
join the majority of trade unions in supporting the targeting,
for the strategic trade reasons outlined above. Raising the
bar by rewarding many and punishing few is the way to give
progressive realization of ILO labor rights more strategic
edge than it currently has.
Marshall’s strategy integrates innovative sub-national
approaches to improving labor standards and wages into the
global ratchets, making it a truly glocal (global and local)
step-by-step implementation strategy. Her approach
recursively allows locally responsive strategies to strengthen
139. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 10, on how strategic trade
interests have enabled some big structural changes to capitalism in the past, such
as the abolition of the eighteenth-century international slave trade, and the 1987
Montreal Protocol.
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national safety nets, and the national to strengthen the local.
She argues that there are already incipient examples of her
proposed strategy in the Asian Floor Wage Alliance, the
Brazil National Slave Eradication Pact “dirty list” of 300
companies benefiting from slave labor, and ILO’s Joint
Maritime
Commission
statutory
determination
of
international minimum wages for seafaring maritime
workers.
Marshall’s scholarship shows pathways for weaving
variegated thin reeds together to craft a resilient fabric of
transformation. The general direction for the struggle it plots
is for trade unions to ally with sympathetic civil society
groups, sympathetic economists and commentators in the
mass media, social media and crowd sourcing to complement
national labor regulation with local, regional and industrylevel regimes. Civil society engagement is critical for
building this regulatory community and achieving normative
acceptance of the justice of a living wage. It strengthens the
International Labor Organization to become a metaregulator of national regulators by sequencing regulatory
ratchets in multi-level governance. All levels of ratchets in
Marshall’s policy design allow each ratchet upwards in
interscalar governance to be meshed with lower- and higherlevel governance ratchets. These settings make it difficult for
one ratchet to ratchet down another. Conversely, some
ratchets up automatically move others up also. This might
seem quite abstract when framed like this, yet Marshall’s
book makes the idea practical and concrete. My discussion of
Marshall’s book has been lengthy because it is a light on the
hill for a pragmatic regulatory politics of moving from worstbest to second-best outcomes. Other advocates of global social
justice strategies, like Oxfam and Citizens for Tax Justice,
can learn much from Marshall’s ideas about building
positively a list of ally countries and firms before turning to
punitive global targeting via a black list of corporations and
countries.
Among the strengths of the work, a significant one is the
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way it combines this reconfigured global strategy for equality
with fine-grained ethnography of four sub-national
experiments—from India, Australia, Cambodia and
Bulgaria. These are experiments in increasing minimum
wages, health and other conditions for the precariat of these
countries, the most marginalized of their informal
workers.140 Marshall diagnoses the successes of these
experiments, which are limited but real, as dependent on a
combination of factors, including attunement of design to
local employment realities and integration of the strategy
with any strengths in the national labor standards. This
integration recursively allows for the local to strengthen
national safety nets and the national to strengthen more
local safety nets. Marshall also frames the studies as
different iterations of smart regulation and responsive
regulation.141 She uses a “medically-inflected” hybrid model
of regulation in the framing of her research. The Bulgarian
experiment is a “stent,” widening the arteries that flow to the
poor. Australia experimented with “pacemaker” innovation
to stimulate a system of living wage justice. India
experimented with an institutional “by-pass,” an alternate
institutional path to living wages. This is a virtuoso reimagining of the theory of smart regulation.142
As with financialization, different capitalisms are
radically variegated in labor markets according to local
conditions. In India, Marshall studies the circumstances of
the country’s huge precariat of head-load (Mathadi) workers
who wander the ports, railway yards, and markets of cities
in search of cash-in-hand work, a lot of which involves
stacking, weighing, and loading as well as head-load
carrying. This labor market developed in response to local
conditions, being partly a result of the way British
140. Local initiatives are shown to be especially important for informal
workers who are not meshed into global supply chains.
141. See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 113 (on smart regulation); AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93 (on responsive regulation).
142. See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 113.
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colonialism stripped peasants of land, creating a desperate
land-poor class who migrated to cities in search of any kind
of labor. There is no labor market in the United States like
this. In the United States, the informal sector is a significant
but marginal variegation of capitalism that especially
employs the minority of illegal immigrants; in India, most
employment is informal and not integrated into global
supply chains that are regulated by labor law.143
Marshall confined her study to the state of Maharashtra,
where there are 500,000 Mathadi workers, and over 200,000
in Mumbai alone. The heavy loads these workers carry
(usually 100 kg) almost always cause break-down of their
capacity to work within 15–20 years from back problems.
Regionally, Mathadi labor is regulated by the Mathadi,
Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of
Employment and Welfare) Act of 1969, which introduced a
system of Mathadi Boards. The act was designed “to secure
basic protective social security for the unorganised workers
by ‘regularising’ their intermittently available continuous
work.”144 The associated Boards target locally specific
variegations of Mathadi work: one for the docks, one for the
markets, and so on. The Mathadi Boards not only set labor
standards; they also act as a labor hire corporation,
socializing what had been a privatized system of labor hire
and exploitation. They transform working conditions by
proactively restructuring the market rather than by
command and control enforcement of non-compliance with
labor laws. The law and the Boards cover standard pay and
conditions as well as pension funds, leave wages, medical
benefits and compensation for injury, making for a local
formalization of an informal sector. The Boards also set up
community
kitchens
to
improve
the
nutritional
circumstances that had long afflicted these impoverished

143. MARSHALL, supra note 136, ch. 4.
144. Ramesh C. Datta, Public Action, Social Security and Unorganised Sector,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 30, 1998, at L2–L5.
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workers who are often remote from their homes. They built
two hospitals that specialize in medical services for the
problems of Mathadi, such as their back injuries. Boards also
assist with the education of workers.
Marshall considers the Mathadi Board system of
regional regulation as a partial but formidable success, one
which lays a foundation for social mobility that sees many
“sons and daughters of mathadi workers [become] medical
doctors, lawyers, IT professionals and the like.”145 Other
Indian states have emulated this Maharashtra innovation in
de-casualizing and empowering labor. Marshall reports that
the Maharashtra case has commonalities with other cases of
regional Indian regulation such as the Welfare Boards of
Kerala, and other geographically local labor regulation
modalities in other countries. Some of the compassionate and
relational regulation of the Kerala and Maharashtra Boards
have been picked up nationally in the Indian Unorganised
Workers’ Social Security Act (2008).146
Marshall’s research shows the clear need for regulation
that is variegated to the changing conditions at regional,
national, and sectoral levels, as well as the nodal levels of
particular ports, markets, and railway yards. Part of the
beauty of the case is in the compassionate character of the
regulatory law this enables.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL META-REGULATION: AN
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY BRANCH
This section shifts focus to the role of Constitutional law
in tempering power and enabling and holding accountable
reforms of the kinds discussed in earlier sections.
One of the deepest structural dilemmas in the struggle
for alleviation of the suffering caused by banks is that banks
have interests in keeping debts high and wages low. So do

145. MARSHALL, supra note 136, at 70.
146. Id. at 71; see also id. ch. 4.
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brands that exploit impoverished workers. They also have an
interest in persuading regulators and their political masters
that what’s good for JP Morgan and Apple is good for
America. One approach to remedy can be found in ancient
Confucian thought about state capture and corruption. One
ancient Chinese remedy was the institution of an
independent examinations branch of governance. To be
appointed as a civil servant, prosecutor, or judge, in an era
that pre-dated universities, one had to pass an exacting
examination tailored to the professional demands of the
examinations branch. The branch served as an ancient
Chinese method of constitutionally regulating poor
governance and for ensuring competence in state
administration. The idea of independent branches that could
regulate the executive government was also evident in the
office of the Censor (御史; yù shǐ) under the Qin and Han
dynasties, which influenced the modern constitutional
thought of Sun Yat Sen.147 Later, the Sui and Tang dynasties
established the office of the tái (臺), which supervised the
conduct of civil servants and military officers.148
In Sun Yat Sen’s Republic of China constitution that was
voted for in 1928, but not implemented until 1947, this
tradition was picked up in an innovative adaptation of
western republican thought to regulate the anarchic conflicts
for power in the early republic.149 That constitution provided
for five semi-autonomous branches of government: a
legislature, an executive, a judiciary, an examinations
branch, and an accountability and integrity branch called the
Control Yuan. The Control Yuan was elected until a 1992
revision to the Constitution and Clause 90 of the 1947
Constitution defined it as “the highest supervisory organ of
147. John Braithwaite, Learning to Scale Up Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL SETTINGS 173, 180 (Kerry Clamp ed.,
2016).
148. Id.
149. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 118–20
(1964).
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the state.” Fundamental to thinking about the Control Yuan
was that it would check capture and abuse of power not only
by regulatory agencies in the executive branch, but also by
the legislature and judiciary. Instead of allowing these
branches to impeach their own wayward members, the
accountability and integrity branch would independently
adjudge impeachment. The Constitutional realities of the
1947 Constitution have meant that censure and “corrective
measures” are speedier and more potent than
impeachment.150 In the thirty years since the demise of
martial law in Taiwan, there have been only 541
impeachment cases.151 Sun Yat Sen’s original thinking on
the separation of powers had a sixth branch, the Auditing
Yuan. However, in 1931 the Auditing Yuan was subsumed
as the Ministry of Audit into the Control Yuan.
Contemporary re-invigorations of this Chinese republican
thought could be considered for the next constitutional
revolution that occurs in a Western democracy. This is
particularly so for a contemporary west where
financialization has captured politics and the regulation of
capital in a way that is dangerous to the sustainability of
freedom. The job of an independent regulation and
accountability branch is the regulation of the state, metagovernance (the governance of governance),152 or metaregulation.153
Sun Yat Sen’s five branches of governance persist in the
Taiwan (Republic of China) constitution today.154 During
150. Herbert Han-Pao Ma, Chinese Control Yuan: An Independent Supervisory
Organ of the State, 1963 WASH. U. L. Q. 401, 411–12.
151. Ernest Caldwell, Widening the Constitutional Gap in China and Taiwan:
History, Reform, and the Transformation of the Control Yuan, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV
739, 757.
152. See Eva Sørensen, Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in
Processes of Democratic Governance, 36 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 98 (2006).
153. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION 245–46 (2002); Peter
Grabosky, Meta-Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND
APPLICATIONS 149 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017).
154. MINGUO XIANFA chs. V–IX (2005) (Taiwan) (English translation available
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Chiang Kai-shek’s long rule of militarized authoritarianism,
Sun Yat Sen ideals were gutted and the Control Yuan
became a puppet of executive rule even as Taiwan turned
back to democracy. While calls to weaken or abolish the
Control Yuan are incessant, in recent democratic renewal of
Taiwan, the Control Yuan does some useful meta-regulatory
work, such as implementing the Sunshine Acts to ensure
transparency,
regulating
political
donations,
and
maintaining registers of assets held by public officials.155 In
addition to supervising what would be called the AuditorGeneral function in the west, the Taiwan Control Yuan
supervises the integrity and independence of the other four
branches by way of the Control Yuan Committee on AntiCorruption. Other Committees exist for other purposes.
There is a Control Yuan Committee on Human Rights with
functions similar to western human rights commissions.
There is a Standing Committee on Judicial Affairs and
Prison Administration, performing the functions judicial
self-regulation performs in the west as well as prison
ombudsman and prison inspectorate functions. The Control
Yuan also has an oversight Standing Committee for National
Defence and Intelligence Affairs, as well as a committee with
oversight of procurement by all branches of governance. A
separate standing committee looks after ethnic minority
affairs. Although the Control Yuan, as in white-settler
societies, has a class interest in upholding Han Chinese
interests over those of the original indigenous minority
owners of the land, it does seem a visionary idea to have a
sub-branch of governance with the job of holding the other
branches to account on questions of indigenous rights and
indigenous reconciliation. More so one that has a high
proportion of indigenous staff members and that is

at https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/94).
155. For a survey of the history of the Control Yuan and its changing powers,
see Ernest Caldwell, Widening the Constitutional Gap in China and Taiwan:
History, Reform, and the Transformation of the Control Yuan, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV
739.
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independent of the (majoritarian) judiciary.
Thailand is the only country to have emulated the
Taiwan constitutional architecture of an accountability and
integrity branch. The 1997 “People’s Constitution” was a
radical document in terms of public participation and rights
accountability. It was dismantled by the 2006 military coup
and the 2007 Constitution promulgated by the Council for
National Security, which made it a crime to criticize the draft
constitution.156 It is perhaps testimony to the virtues of this
architecture that tyrants found it so dangerous. Members of
the fourth inspection branch of the 1997 Thai Constitution
oversaw impeachment in the other three branches, the
election commission, the human rights commission,
ombudsman, audit and anti-corruption functions, as in the
Taiwan Control Yuan. The 1997 Thai Constitution involved
the further innovation that membership of this fourth
branch was only elected from candidates who were not
members of political parties and for one term only. This
served as a prudent check against progressive capture by
parties and business cronies that dominate the executive and
legislature and stack the judiciary.
There is something attractive about tempering power
through Sun Yat Sen’s architecture of a fourth accountability
branch of governance comprised of many branches within it.
This is so even though his law that was written for all of
China was pushed aside by the Communist Party and only
embraced (and corrupted) by the military dictatorship in
Taiwan for window dressing, and then cast aside again after
the only genuine attempt at emulation when a military coup
afflicted Thailand in 2006. For societies where settlers have
forced indigenous landowners off their country, there is
appeal in one of Taiwan’s branches being elected from
indigenous peoples for oversight of the other branches in

156. See Somroutai Sapsomboon & Supalak G. Khundee, Referendum Law or
Penalty Law?, THE NATION (THAILAND) (July 6, 2007), http://www.webcitation.org
/6EK01lrNZ.
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terms of the longue durée of reconciliation. This in the
context of histories of indigenous dispossession and mass
atrocity, disproportionate contemporary imprisonment, and
abuse of indigenous rights more broadly. Constitutionally
empowering this kind of compassionate entrenchment of
indigenous regulatory authority is appealing and novel.157
For societies ruled by banker power, the idea of independent
meta-regulation of banking regulators, central banks, and
labor regulators to ensure they are not captured or corrupted
by capital or by politicians on the prowl for campaign
contributions is an attractive one to have ready in the top
drawer after the next crisis. Promising experiments in
republican governance for the future from our study of the
past might include those that never fully blossomed,
especially so with institutions for checking domination killed
off by the tyrannies of militaries, monarchs, and party
machines.
IX. CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES
Totalizing tropes like neoliberalism can inhibit the
analytic imagination from grasping the variegation of
capitalism. Likewise, it can inhibit the regulatory
imagination from crafting regulation that can be responsive
to plural capitalism. I have argued that actioning this is not
a craft of destroying the power of capital, but of tempering it
so it becomes stronger in the form of a hybrid governance
consisting of many branches of power.158 It is a craft of
building and progressively strengthening a strong
constitution, strong government, strong markets, strong civil

157. It is also consistent with the proposals in the Uluru Statement from the
Heart, which came about after a dialogue of Australian indigenous leaders in
2017. 2017 FIRST NATIONS NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REFERENDUM
COUNCIL, ULURU STATEMENT FROM THE HEART, REFERENDUM COUNCIL (May 26,
2017), https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/sites/default/files/2017-05/Uluru
_Statement_From_The_Heart_0.PDF.
158. On the concept of hybridity, see HYBRIDITY ON THE GROUND
PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT (Joanne Wallis et al. eds., 2018).
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society, strong individuals, each enabling and checking the
other. The article has sought to illustrate the relevance of a
tempering power framework to the most commanding
institutions of contemporary capitalism: financial markets,
information markets, labor markets, constitutions, and the
regulation of war and peace (illustrated with Timor-Leste).
Contemporary liberal democracies are at risk of a
dangerous short-termism fuelled by financialization. This is
a capitalism that allows puppeteers of bank power to
succumb to an ethic of ruthlessness. In the extreme case,
bankers accumulate short-term bonuses that they disinvest
from their own banks when the time is right, short the
disastrous future prospects of bank stocks after they get out,
allow taxpayers to bail banks out, and then start another
merry-go-round of untempered power.159 Financialization
creates an unjust society that refuses a fair share of the
nation’s wealth to those who earn their living from wages.
This society burdens our children and grandchildren with
debt, national and personal, more debt than is prudent.
Institutional catastrophe may then open a door to crisis and
authoritarianism. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, in a
smaller way than German hyperinflation after the global
crash from 1929, has delivered impetus to authoritarian
politics of varying but considerable degrees across Western
states today. In the long term we must learn to conquer this
problem or it will conquer us. Authoritarian capitalism
might or might not continue to displace liberal capitalism to
take over the world.

159. The “make hay while the sun shines” and then “pass the parcel” mentality
was well documented by ethnographic insights about the crisis, particularly from
the ratings agencies. One Standard & Poor’s executive said before the crash, “let’s
hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters”;
another said “We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would
rate it”; another: “Profits were running the show.” O’BRIEN, supra note 95, at 78.
We know now that there was a widespread Wall Street belief that the party of
unaccountable profiteering would crash, but that the only option was to maximize
profits until the crash came, securing as much of your bonus earnings as you
could in safe havens for when the music stopped.
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Regulation, it is hypothesized, has more potential to be
just and effective in response to the challenges of
financialization when it:
is motivated by an explicit philosophy of tempering
power, an accountability that renders power less
arbitrary, more compassionate and relational;
is variegated to be responsive to the variegation of
capitalism across space, time, sectors, firms, and
nodes of governance;
is constitutionally meta-regulated for accountability and
integrity of tempered power;
can escalate from relational justice to deterrent legal
formalism;160
is on guard against the risk that authoritarian
capitalism could prove more sustainable than liberal
capitalism for the challenge of steering demand
without unmanageable debt and while paying
adequate wages;
is on guard against the way liberal capitalism nurtures
internal variegations of authoritarian capitalism
inside the service sectors of their own “liberal”
societies, as in the exploitation of illegal immigrants
or guest workers;
understands the danger of corporate power becoming
liberalism’s fifth column when firms proactively
prefer to locate production in authoritarian societies
that crush rights, underpay workers, and endanger
the environment. Untempered corporate power is
encouraged by ruthless investors to invent new
technologies of surveillance and military domination
for the defense of authoritarianism. Liberal
capitalism therefore paradoxically strengthens
authoritarian capitalism in its competition with

160. On this, see more detail in Braithwaite, supra note 6.
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liberal capitalism.
There is of course an even bigger challenge in the face of
which liberal capitalism may prove unsustainable. This is
how to prevent ecological collapse. Regulation must shift the
shape of the economy so that the demand that averts
economic crisis and authoritarianism is not demand for
material goods, but for more human services such as health,
aged care, education, and demand for regulatory steering of
capitalism itself.161 There are no guarantees that liberal
capitalism will prove more capable than authoritarian
capitalism at navigating the challenges of regulating finance
and guaranteeing a fair labor share of national income.
Likewise there is no guarantee that it will be more effective
at averting ecological collapse. That larger challenge for
republican governance is one I will wrestle with in future
work. This journey will likewise be lit by forty years of
illuminating
Baldy
scholarship
on
environmental
governance.

161. See RICHARD DENNISS, CURING AFFLUENZA: HOW TO BUY LESS STUFF AND
SAVE THE WORLD (2017); RESTORATIVE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION OF HUMAN
SERVICES (Gale Burford, John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite eds., 2019).

